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1. Alan S. Blinder
6.1 Introduction and Preview
The more things change, the more they remain the same.
The ultimate purpose of an economy, it may fairly be said, is to enhance
the material well-being of its people. In the philosophical pecking order,
such a crass and narrow goal may not appear as lofty as, let us say,
inner peace and spiritual uplift. But, as has oft been remarked, it is diffi-
cult to feed the soul while the stomach is empty.
Because of the absolutely central position of the task of producing
more and better goods, and distributing them equitably (what a loaded
word that is!) among the citizenry, the topics of the other chapters in
this book may justifiably be considered subservient to this one. Changes
in the financial system, in taxation and public expenditure, in the struc-
ture of industry, or in international economic relations are all most
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naturally appraised by asking how much they contribute to economic
well-being. Thus this chapter may, without stretching the imagination
too far, be thought of as the "outputs" produced by the other chapters'
"inputs." At least this is the preeminence I claim for my topic.
How well has the United States economy performed the two central
tasks of raising living standards and enhancing economic equality during
the postwar period? The basic story is simple enough to summarize in a
few words, though complex enough to require volumes for a complete
account. Where the average level of economic well-being is concerned,
the record is one of steady improvement. Not an unblemished record to
be sure, and not as spectacular a record as the postwar "economic mir-
acles" of Germany and Japan, but a creditable record nonetheless.
However, when we turn to consider the distribution of economic wel-
fare—economic equality, as it is commonly called—the central stylized
fact is one of constancy. As measured in the official data, income in-
equality was just about the same in 1977 (the last year for which data
were available when this was written) as it was in 1947. Though this
seems a straightforward conclusion, it actually conceals a host of con-
troversies and puzzles. For the stability we observe in the income distri-
bution is not the result of a boring, static economy, nor the result of
some "natural economic law," as Pareto (1897) thought. Rather it is
the result of a confluence of powerful forces, some pulling toward greater
equality and some pulling toward greater inequality, which together pro-
duced a great underwater swirl while causing barely a ripple on the
surface.
For example, the American population experienced substantial demo-
graphic changes during this thirty-year period. The causes of these
changes were varied, complex, in part obvious and in part obscure, but
in any case well beyond the scope of this chapter.
1 What matters for our
purposes is that, given the way income distribution data are compiled,
these demographic shifts would have produced a substantial trend toward
greater inequality had not other factors intervened. It will not be giving
away the plot to suggest that government transfer programs played a
major role in that intervention.
Even the basic stylized fact that income inequality has remained con-
stant since World War II has not gone unchallenged. It has been argued,
for example, that if we measured income more comprehensively than
we do, or if we measured it over periods longer than a year, a clearer
trend toward equality would emerge. As we shall see, seemingly mun-
dane issues like how to define and measure income are of considerable
importance in appraising the economy's postwar performance; and they
also raise some surprisingly profound (and perhaps insoluble) issues.
Since this chapter is a long one, it will be useful to provide a reader's
guide at the outset. Section 6.2 disposes briefly of some preliminary
issues of measurement—the measurement of welfare, the measurement417 The Level and Distribution of Economic Weil-Being
of income, and the measurement of inequality. The next two sections,
which constitute the bulk of the paper, address the two central topics
of the chapter—postwar trends in the level of income (section 6.3) and
its inequality (section 6.4). Section 6.4, in particular, examines in some
depth the controversies alluded to above. Section 6.5 then takes up sev-
eral peripheral aspects of the distribution of income which seem to be of
special interest—poverty, black-white income differentials, and male-
female income differentials. Finally, in section 6.6, the myopic concen-
tration on income is remedied by examining postwar developments in
nonincome aspects of well-being such as leisure, wealth, and health.
Section 6.7 offers some brief concluding remarks.
6.2 Preliminaries
6.2.1 From the Sublime to the Ridiculous
The essay begins with a strategic retreat which moves farther and
farther from a concept that is interesting but unmeasurable (welfare)
and closer and closer to a concept that is measurable but possibly unin-
teresting (money income as defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census).
Like most strategic retreats, this one does accomplish something. But it
must be admitted that its direction is dictated more by expedience than
by principle. The retreat takes place in several stages.
The first step is to admit that man does not live on bread alone.
Political freedom, peace, inner tranquillity, a happy family life, and so
on may be far more important to many people than the bill of goods
and services they consume. Still, it would be the height of folly for an
economist to write an essay on these more ephemeral aspects of human
welfare. On grounds of comparative advantage, therefore, I will for the
most part restrict my attention to what is normally considered economic
well-being.
The second step is to concede that there is little scientific basis for
deciding how much "utility" any specific individual gets at any particular
time, and even less for deciding whether Laurel gets more or less than
Hardy. Two avenues therefore remain open. We can look at levels and
distributions of items which are presumed to yield utility, such as con-
sumption goods and leisure time. Or we can look at peoples' opportuni-
ties, as summarized by their endowments and the prices they face, on
the assumption that people with more generous opportunities achieve
correspondingly higher levels of satisfaction.
2
While part of our army will stop to fight the battle here, most of it
will retreat one step more—to the use of current income to summarize
the whole opportunity set. Now we know this is not quite right. Two
individuals with identical opportunities will have different incomes if
their preferences differ.
3 Ill health may mean that more current income418 Alan S. Blinder/Irving Kristol/Wilbur J. Cohen
is necessary to achieve any given level of satisfaction, or a large store
of accumulated wealth may mean that less is necessary. While several
of these qualifications will be dealt with in what follows, the data dictate
that the analysis be conducted mainly in terms of income.
6.2.2 The Measurement of Income
Perhaps the worst news is saved for last. The only reasonably con-
sistent time series of income distributions covering a long period comes
from the annual Current Population Survey (CPS), which uses an in-
come definition that is far from the economist's (or anyone else's)
ideal.
4 Economists define an individual's income as the amount he could
consume without depleting his wealth—the sum of his expenditures plus
any increase in his wealth. What does the CPS offer us? Basically, a
distribution of money income in which some sources of income are
grossly underreported, capital gains are excluded, cash transfers are in-
cluded but transfers in kind are excluded, and from which no deduction
is made for income and payroll taxes. Measured income thus falls far
short of the ideal concept of income. Given the wide cleavage that
already exists between well-being and even this ideal concept of income,
one might well wonder if our data do not leave us with a grin without a
cat. I proceed nonetheless in this essay to analyze the grin. However,
some time will be spent in section 6.4 questioning whether a better
measure of income might tell a different story about postwar trends in
income inequality.
Our interest in the level and distribution of income clearly is moti-
vated by a belief that we can use these two numbers as approximate
indicators of economic welfare. Specifically, we would like to believe
that higher or more equally distributed incomes mean that society is
"better off." Having decided, for lack of a superior alternative, to use
census money income, the next step is to decide on the recipient unit.
Whose incomes shall we study?
This question, which may seem foolish and "academic" at first, is in
fact very important because of the demographic changes mentioned
earlier. For it appears that one of the items that Americans have pur-
chased with their postwar prosperity has been the privilege of living
apart from their relatives. Think what happens, for example, when higher
living standards and/or more generous public transfer programs enable
junior, or grandma and grandpa, to move into an apartment of their
own. A new economic unit is formed, with a rather low income, thus
bringing down the average level of income and raising its inequality.
Both economic indicators will therefore signal a deterioration in welfare,
though we may presume that these changes in living arrangements actu-
ally make the parties involved better off.
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We therefore must exercise extreme caution in interpreting postwar
trends in income distribution. The Census Bureau offers separate income
distributions for families ("a group of two or more persons related by
blood, marriage, or adoption and residing together") and for unrelated
individuals, as well as a pooled distribution that combines both types of
units. In this essay, we will pay attention to each of these distributions
and to the interrelationships among them.
Further perplexities enter when we ask another question: why should
we be interested in distributions of annual incomes instead of incomes
measured over some alternative accounting period? One answer is
straightforward and prosaic: that's the way the data come. But a deeper
question is not so easily answered. If we could measure income over any
accounting period we wished, what accounting period would be best?
It seems clear that periods like a day or a week are far too short to
generate meaningful data on income inequality. All of us have weeks
of zero income (at least on a cash accounting basis), without being
"poor" in any real sense. So longer periods are necessary. But why stop
at a year? Clearly a year is far too short an accounting period to place
many people meaningfully within the income distribution. For example,
since investment in human capital typically leads to rising age-earnings
profiles, many people who are quite well off in a lifetime sense may
appear quite "poor" during certain years. For these and other reasons
many economists, including myself (1974; 1976), have been attracted
to the distribution of lifetime incomes, though even this choice is not
unobjectionable.
As we shall see, there is evidence that income distributions over
multiyear accounting periods display less inequality than income dis-
tributions for a single year. More important, there is reason to believe
that a stronger trend toward equality might emerge if somehow we were
able to measure the distribution of lifetime income.
6.2.3 The Measurement of Inequality
There are many ways to measure how "equal" or "unequal" any given
distribution of income is;
6 but the availability of data dictates that we
concentrate on two. The first is straightforward and requires no elabora-
tion: we can examine trends in the shares of total income accruing to
specific income groups, such as the poorest fifth or the richest fifth, for
example. The second is something called the Gini ratio and requires
some explanation.
7
Income distributions are typically displayed in a convenient graphical
device invented by M. O. Lorenz (1905); two such Lorenz curves are
depicted in figure 6.1. To construct a Lorenz curve, begin with a square
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Two Lorenz curves for family income.
sure the cumulative percentage of consumer units, starting from the
poorest; along the vertical axis, measure the cumulative share of income
received by these units. Data on income shares then appear as points
within the square, and the curvilinear line connecting them is the Lorenz
curve.
Every Lorenz curve has four basic properties:
1. It must begin at the origin, since zero units have zero income
2. It must end at the upper-right corner of the diagram since 100
percent of the units must receive all the income
3. If incomes were distributed equally, the Lorenz curve would be a
diagonal line connecting these two points, since the "poorest" 20
percent of units would receive 20 percent of the income, the
"poorest" 40 percent would receive 40 percent, and so on
4. In a real economy, in which significant income differentials exist,
the Lorenz curve will "sag" downward from this diagonal line
representing perfect equality. The reason is straightforward. If
there is any inequality at all, the poorest 20 percent of units, for
example, must receive less than 20 percent of the income, and the
poorest 40 percent must receive less than 40 percent.421 The Level and Distribution of Economic Weil-Being
Lorenz curves are useful in depicting inequality because curves that
lie closer to the diagonal represent distributions with less inequality. This
is also illustrated in figure 6.1 which shows, for the family income dis-
tribution, the most equal and most unequal distributions during the en-
tire postwar period. (The fact that they are so close together illustrates
the aforementioned stability of the income distribution.) In fact, the
area between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal (shaded in fig. 6.1),
expressed as a fraction of the area beneath the diagonal,
8 is often used
as a summary measure of inequality. This fraction is called the Gini
ratio, after its inventor Corrado Gini (1936), and it is clear that higher
Gini ratios connote greater inequality.
Since Gini ratios appear so frequently in this essay, a word on their
interpretation is in order. The Gini ratio is a purely mechanical measure
of inequality, while our interest in inequality is as an indicator of social
welfare. Suppose in comparing two income distributions we find that
distribution A assigns less income both to the poorest 20 percent of
families and to the richest 20 percent than does distribution B. (Distri-
bution A naturally has to assign more income to the middle 60 percent
of families.) Which distribution has more "equality"? Clearly A is more
equal at the upper tail (the rich are not quite so rich), but B is more
equal at the lower tail (the poor are not quite so poor). But which
distribution is "better"? It is clear that the answer is unclear. It depends
on whether society attaches more importance to income differences at
the high or low end of the income distribution. But the Gini ratio (or,
for that matter, any summary statistic) tolerates no such ambiguity. It
will state, for example, that the Gini ratio for distribution A is .36 while
that for distribution B is .37. For this reason, we must take care in pro-
nouncing distributions with lower Gini ratios as "better."
There is, however, one important circumstance in which the Gini ratio
can be relied upon to rank different income distributions properly. This
is the case where the Lorenz curves do not cross (as in fig. 6.1), for then
the more unequal distribution will always get the higher Gini ratio. The
conclusion then is this. When Lorenz curves cross, the Gini ratio may
rank income distributions incorrectly, and thus cannot be taken very
seriously. However, when Lorenz curves do not cross, such misrankings
cannot occur and the Gini ratio provides useful information. Fortunately
for us, most of the inequality comparisons we have to make are between
Lorenz curves that do not cross.
9
6.3 Trends in the Level of Income and Consumption
I turn now to the first of the two major concerns of this chapter:
What has happened to the average level of economic well-being in the
United States since World War II? As noted earlier, I will at first stealth-422 Alan S. Blinder/Irving Kristol/Wilbur J. Cohen
ily translate this question to: What has happened to the average level of
income}, postponing the consideration of nonincome aspects of well-
being to section 6.6.
The basic story is, of course, extremely well known. The postwar
United States economy has generally produced growth of per capita
incomes, though that growth has been punctuated by periodic reces-
sions.
1
0 This stylized fact is illustrated in figure 6.2, which charts the
behavior of real disposable income per capita from 1947 to 1978. The
trend in consumption, naturally enough, has followed the trend in in-
come rather closely. But the aggregate data conceal some dramatic
changes in patterns of consumption.
6.3.1 The Growth of Incomes, 1947-77
Many serious shortcomings of census income were mentioned in sec-
tion 6.2. Fortunately, in studying trends in the level of income, we need
not restrict ourselves to census income since much better measures are







i I i i i i i i i i i I i i i i I i i i i I i i i i i i i I
1950 I960 1970 1978
Year
Fig. 6.2 Real disposable income per capita, 1947-78 (in 1972 dol-
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The NIA concept that comes closest to census income is personal
income (PI). And it is easy to remedy several problems with census in-
come by supplementing personal income with other NIA data. First, as
a crude way of accounting for (a smoothed version of) capital gains,
we can add corporate retained earnings to personal income. Second, we
can put personal income on a more consistent posttransfer but pretax
basis (like census income) by including not only the employee's share
of the payroll tax but also the employer's share. Making both these
changes in the NIA data leads me to an income concept that I call
augmented personal income.
11
A more fundamental problem with census income, however, is the
illogic of adding in transfers but failing to deduct the taxes that pay for
them. This is easily remedied in the aggregate data by deducting both
personal income taxes and payroll taxes (both shares) from augmented
personal income to arrive at an income concept that I call augmented
disposable income.
12
The decade-by-decade annual growth rates in real census income, real
augmented personal income, and real augmented disposable income
1
3
are presented in table 6.1. Not surprisingly, for the postwar period as a
whole the growth rates of census income and augmented personal in-
come are almost identical, while the growth rate of real augmented dis-
posable income is about one-third of a percentage point less. Com-
pounded over thirty years, these figures mean that from 1947 to 1977
real augmented personal income per family increased 95 percent, while
real augmented disposable income per family increased 77 percent. The
gap is accounted for by an increasing burden of personal taxation (with,
presumably, a corresponding increase in public services.)
Table 6.1 Annualized Growth Rates (in Percentages) in Real Income per







































Sources: Computed by the author from data in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Cur-
rent Population Reports, series P-60, no. 118; Survey of Current Business, July
1979; and The National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929-
1974.
"Augmented PI and augmented DI are denned in the text. It was assumed that each
of these aggregates was divided between families and UIs in the same proportion
as census income.424 Alan S. Blinder/ Irving Kristol/Wilbur J. Cohen
When we break the thirty-year period down into decades, the close
agreement between census income and augmented personal income
starts to melt away. More importantly, a striking difference between the
postwar economic progress of families and unrelated individuals (UIs)
emerges. For both groups, and for any of the income measures, the
middle decade (which was dominated by the long boom of the 1960s)
exhibited the strongest growth. But the rankings of the other two decades
is reversed. Apparently, families fared much better than unrelated indi-
viduals between 1947 and 1957, while unrelated individuals fared much
better than families during the most recent decade. Why? The reasons
are to be found in the demographic shifts summarized in tables 6.2 and
6.3. These tables show that while demographic changes during 1947-
57 were mostly minor for families, unrelated individuals became more
likely to be female or elderly. By contrast, during the last decade unre-
lated individuals became much less likely to be female, while more fam-
ilies became female headed. (Both groups became younger on average.)
Where Did It Come From?
Naturally, all the components of personal income participated in the
postwar growth, though certainly not equally. Table 6.4 shows that
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Sources: Current Population Reports, Series P-60, no. 118;
Series P-20, nos. 21, 80 and Technical Paper no. 17.425 The Level and Distribution of Economic Weil-Being
Table 6.3 Selected Demographic Changes among














































Sources: Current Population Reports, Series P-60, nos. 5,
30, 59, 118, and Technical Paper no. 17.
wages, interest, and transfers accounted for greater shares of augmented
personal income in 1977 than was true in 1947, whereas proprietor's
income, rents, and corporate profits accounted for smaller shares.
1
4
Where Did It Go?
The concept of augmented personal income as defined here can be
divided into three principal uses:
1. Spending: the sum of personal consumption expenditures, interest
paid to businesses, and transfers to foreigners, minus indirect taxes.
2. Saving: personal saving as in the NIA plus retained earnings.





















































Source: National income accounts.
Compensation of employees.
2Corporate profits (with inventory valuation adjustment and
capital consumption adjustment) minus corporate tax lia-
bilities. This is equal to the sum of dividends and retained
earnings.426 Alan S. Blinder/ Irving Kristol/Wilbur J. Cohen
3. Taxes: personal taxes as in the NIA plus contributions for social
insurance plus indirect taxes. (This can be viewed as purchases of
public consumption.)
Using this three-way split, table 6.5 shows that spending has com-
manded a dwindling share and taxes have commanded an expanding
share during the postwar period. The share of savings exhibits no trend,
though saving rates were unusually low in three of the last four years.
Closer inspection of these data reveals that the share of consumption
stabilized between 62 and 63 percent around 1966 or so, and the share
of taxes stabilized near 30 percent around 1968. Thus, since 1968
American consumers have paid about 30 percent of their gross incomes
to the tax collector, saved about 7 percent, and spent the remaining 63
percent.
6.3.2 Patterns of Consumption, 1947-77
So income and consumption have grown mightily over the postwar
period. How have American consumers spent this largesse? An exam-
ination of postwar changes in consumption patterns is interesting for the
profile it draws of the American way of life. And it also holds a few
surprises. A logical place to start is with changes in budget shares. What
fraction of each dollar of consumer spending was spent on various items
in 1947 and 1977? Which items commanded an increasing share of the
consumer's budget and which a decreasing share?
Table 6.6 contains some answers; but there are too many numbers in
this table for it to "speak for itself," and many others hidden in the data
that underlie it. Let us see what story these data tell.






























Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (1976) and Sur-
vey of Current Business, July 1979.
1Personal outlays less indirect taxes.
2Personal savings plus retained earnings.
3Personal taxes plus contributions for social insurance plus
indirect taxes.427 The Level and Distribution of Economic Weil-Being
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Sources: Computed by author from data in U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
The National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929-1974, and
Survey of Current Business, July 1979.
^Includes tobacco and alcoholic beverages.
2Includes shoes, accessories, and jewelry.
3Mosfly costs of purchasing, maintaining, and operating automobiles.
includes expenditures abroad by United States residents.
5Radio and television receivers, records, and musical instruments.
6Wheel goods, toys, sports equipment, boats, and pleasure aircraft. Includes both
durables and nondurables.
7For medical care, hospitalization, and income loss. Does not include workmen's
compensation. Data pertain to 1948.428 Alan S. Blinder/ Irving Kristol Wilbur J. Cohen
At the coarsest level of aggregation, the table shows just about what
we expect. Americans are now spending more of their budgets on hous-
ing, medical care, private transportation, recreation, and personal ser-
vices than they were in 1947. At the same time, they are spending less
on food, clothing, and public transportation. But if we peer a bit below
the surface, some fascinating details emerge.
Food
Spending on virtually every category of food declined in relative im-
portance over this thirty-year period, including even meals away from
home (which came as a surprise to me). They claimed 6.70 out of every
dollar in 1947, but only 5.20 in 1977. (One can only imagine what the
French would think of this!)
The most dramatic decline, again surprisingly, was for alcoholic bev-
erages—which accounted for only 2.4 percent of the 1977 budget as
against 5.3 percent in 1947. In fact, real consumption of alcoholic
beverages per capita increased only 12 percent over the thirty-year pe-
riod, despite the fact that its price relative to all consumption items fell
by 26 percent. Americans are indeed drinking (relatively) less.
Accompanying the decline in relative spending on food came a notice-
able upgrading in diets (though not necessarily in their nutritive content).
As table 6.7 indicates, per capita consumption of beef almost doubled,
per capita consumption of chicken almost tripled, and consumption of
such luxury and convenience items as ice cream, processed fruits, and
processed vegetables registered dramatic increases. Concurrent with these
increases came sharp declines in per capita consumption of such obvi-
ously inferior goods as pork, lard, potatoes, and cornmeal. Consumption
Table 6.7 Civilian per Capita Consumption of Selected Food Items, 1940


















































Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, vol. 1,
Series G881-915.
banned or frozen fruits and fruit juices; dried fruit.
2Canned or frozen.429 The Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being
of fresh fruits and vegetables also declined, though one may legitimately
question whether this marked an increase in living standards. (Adelle
Davis lives!)
Housing
The costs of owning or renting a home or apartment claimed 15.5
percent of consumer budgets in 1977 as against 9.9 percent in 1947.
Almost all of the increase is accounted for by owner-occupied housing,
as growing income levels and strong incentives set up by the income tax
system combined to induce a substantial shift from renting to owning.
In 1940 only 44 percent of Americans owned their own home; by 1970,
63 percent did (see table 6.8, part A).
It is worth noting that the rapid escalation of housing prices that we
have experienced in recent years was not characteristic of the postwar
period as a whole. In fact, between 1947 and 1977 housing prices in-
creased only 151 percent while consumer prices in general increased 165
percent. Housing commanded an increasing budget share because real
per capita consumption of housing tripled.
Some data compiled by Lebergott (1976) enable us to go somewhat
beyond these rather dry statistics (see table 6.8, part A). Between 1940
and 1970, crowding diminished significantly. The fraction of housing
units with more persons than rooms declined from 20 percent to 8 per-
cent, and the average number of persons per room fell from .74 to .62.
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Sources: Lebergott 1976; except for average age of (private nonfarm) housing
stock and percentage owner-occupied, which came from Historical Statistics, Series
217 and 243.430 Alan S. Blinder/ Irving Kristol/Wilbur J. Cohen
The quality of housing also improved. The average age of the housing
stock fell by four years, the fraction of housing units with running water
increased from 70 percent to 98 percent, and the fraction with flush




Other improvements in the way Americans are housed become appar-
ent only when we look at expenditures on household operation. While
the total budget share spent on this category did not change, its compo-
sition underwent radical surgery. Table 6.6 shows, for example, that the
budget share allocated to household appliances fell almost in half be-
tween 1947 and 1977. What this conceals is that the very steep decline
in the relative prices of these items enabled Americans to have more
and more while spending less and less.
1
6 By 1977, real spending per
capita on household appliances was more than double what it had been
in 1947, and the stock of household durables must have increased by
much more than this. Lebergott (1976) reports, for example, that the
fraction of American families owning mechanical refrigerators increased
from 44 percent to 99 percent between 1940 and 1970. The penetration
of televisions went from zero in 1940 to virtually 100 percent by 1970.
Sources of power for household operation tell a fascinating tale.
Spending on electricity more than doubled despite a decline in its rela-
tive price; real spending per capita increased more than fivefold. Con-
currently, fuel oil and coal demanded a decreasing share of consumers'
budgets despite a sharply increasing relative price. In fact, household
usage of fuel oil and coal was unchanged in absolute terms between
1947 and 1977 despite a 53 percent increase in population. There was,
in brief, a veritable revolution in the way homes were heated—away
from dirty fuels such as coal and wood, which also require considerable
effort to use, and toward such cleaner and more convenient fuels as oil,
gas, and electricity. Lebergott (1976), for example, reports that the
fraction of United States families heating by wood or coal dropped from
78 percent to 4 percent, while the fraction using oil or gas rose from 22
percent to 82 percent, between 1940 and 1970 (see table 6.8, part B).
There were other notable changes as well. The average American
used the telephone about five and one-half times as much in 1977 as in
1947, but did so while allocating a budget share only twice as large.
One further item which is of trivial importance in consumer budgets
nowadays, but is nonetheless interesting for the light it sheds on postwar
changes in America, is spending on domestic service. In 1947, Ameri-
cans spent 1.5 percent of their budget on domestic service—a sum al-
most as large as what they spent on doctors and dentists, and even larger
than what they spent on either local public transportation or private
education. About one household in fourteen had a domestic employee.431 The Level and Distribution of Economic Weil-Being
By 1977, the price of domestic service had increased 321 percent (ver-
sus 165 percent for consumer prices in general); only about one house-
hold in twenty-seven had a domestic worker;
1
7 and this budget item
claimed only 0.60 out of every consumer dollar. In real terms, the con-
sumption of domestic services declined absolutely by 31 percent (or 55
percent on a per capita basis). In the murder mysteries of the 1970s,
the butler was never there to do it.
Clothing
Food, clothing, and shelter are supposed to be the three basic neces-
sities. Like food, clothing gobbled up a smaller and smaller share of the
consumer's budget during the postwar period. By 1977, consumers were
spending only 80 of every dollar on clothing (including shoes, jewelry,
and accessories) as compared to 140 in 1947. In part, this resulted from
a decline in the relative price of clothing (by 28 percent from 1947 to
1977); but even real spending on clothing grew noticeably slower than
total spending.
Food, clothing, and shelter together, it may be noted, absorbed fully
88 percent of total spending in 1947 but less than 75 percent in 1977.
Room was being made for nonnecessities.
Transportation
Spending patterns on transportation goods and services reveal a pat-
tern that is fascinating even though its basic outlines are well known.
The almighty automobile was already well ensconced on the American
scene by 1947—claiming 8 percent of consumer budgets for its purchase,
care, and feeding (as compared with only 1.8 percent for all forms of
purchased transportation). But the automobilization of America accel-
erated during the postwar period. By 1977, consumers were spending
13.40 out of every dollar on their cars, and a negligible 0.80 on pur-
chased transportation.
When we recall that air travel was almost nonexistent in 1947, but
dominated purchased intercity travel by 1977, the comparison is more
dramatic still. Purchased transportation excluding air travel took 1.70
out of every consumer dollar in 1947, but only 0.40 in 1977. It is only
a slight exaggeration to say that the postwar period witnessed the death
of the train, the bus, and the subway.
Recreation
Spending patterns on recreational goods and services offer some sur-
prises. Even including foreign travel as recreation,
1
8 the share of recre-
ational spending in consumer budgets increased only 1.5 percentage
points during the postwar period. This is much less than Madison Ave-
nue has led us to expect. Furthermore, more than all of this increase432 Alan S. Blinder/ Irving Kristol/Wilbur J. Cohen
was accounted for by only three categories of spending: foreign travel
(from 0.5 percent to 1.0 percent); purchases of televisions, radios, and
similar goods (from 0.9 percent to 1.5 percent); and purchases of recre-
ational hardgoods such as toys, sports equipment, bicycles, and boats
(from 1.2 percent to 1.8 percent). Television sets are particularly re-
markable since they claimed an increasing budget share despite a price
that fell absolutely by 16 percent (that's right!).
1
9 America's love affair
with the television is a notable feature of the postwar period.
Several categories of recreational spending actually made decreasing
claims on the consumer's budget, notably admissions to spectator events
(movies, theater, sports events) which received only 0.60 out of every
consumer dollar in 1977 as compared to 1.20 in 1947. And this occurred
despite the fact that prices for such events rose 300 percent (as com-
pared to only 165 percent for overall consumer prices). Real purchases
of such admissions actually declined 16 percent despite rising population
and rising real income. So much for the alleged boom in movies and
spectator sports.
Personal Services
Personal services are an odd mixture including such diverse items as
private educational spending, life insurance, legal fees, and the costs of
stock brokerage. All of these grew rapidly, with spending on stock-
brokers displaying the fastest growth (increasing more than eighteen-
fold) and life insurance costs having the smallest (increasing more than
eight-fold).
Medical Care
Everyone knows that Americans are spending more on medical care
than they did early in the postwar period (9.6 percent of consumer
budgets as compared to 4.5 percent). And everyone knows that con-
sumers are unhappy about the soaring costs of medical care. The tre-
mendous increase in the share of the budget going to medical care is due
both to its increasing relative price and to a rapid increase in real con-
sumption of medical services, especially hospital services. While health
has improved demonstrably during the last thirty years (more on this in
section 6.6), this may have been due more to advances in public health
than to increased personal expenditures on medical care.
Summary
During the thirty-year period from 1947 to 1977, real consumption
per capita increased by more than 80 percent. As compared to their
counterparts in 1947, Americans in 1977 traveled by airplane and
watched TV vastly more. They replaced pork, lard, cornmeal, and fresh433 The Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being
vegetables in their diets with beef, poultry, and processed fruits and
vegetables. They made much greater use of electricity, the telephone,
and hospitals, and they spent much more on their own homes—which
they heated by gas and oil rather than coal and wood. They bought
more toys, sports equipment, and other recreational goods (but not
more admission tickets), and devoted a good deal more of their budgets
to nurturing their cars.
During the same period, travel by bus, rail, and subway diminished
greatly; domestic servants nearly disappeared from the scene; and the
basic necessities of life—food, clothing, and shelter—commanded ever
decreasing shares of the consumer budget.
One seems forced to the conclusion that the average level of economic
well-being both changed in content and improved drastically. Virtually
everyone shared in economic growth, but not equally. I turn my atten-
tion now to trends in income inequality.
6.4 Trends in Income Inequality
Whereas the level of income was mostly increasing during the post-
war period, the central stylized fact about income inequality has been
its constancy. Table 6.9 displays the basic data that support this fact,
and they certainly seem unequivocal. According to the Gini ratio, for
example, 1957 was the most equal year and 1961 was the most unequal.
Inequality in 1977 was the same as it was in 1947. If we accept these






































































































Source: Current Population Reports, Series P-60, no. 118, table 13.434 Alan S. Blinder/ Irving Kristol/ Wilbur J. Cohen
But there are a host of very good reasons not to accept these data at
face value—which is why this section occupies many pages instead of
one sentence. First, the changing structure of the United States popula-
tion by age, sex, and family composition raises questions about the
comparability of the data over time. Rough "corrections" for these de-
mographic shifts point to a slight trend toward equality which the raw
data mask. Second, attempts to improve the measurement of income by
such methods as subtracting taxes or adding transfers in kind seem to
produce an income concept whose distribution displays greater equaliza-
tion over the period than does census income. Third, and most specu-
latively, it has been suggested that the portion of measured inequality
that is simply due to the fact that different people are at different stages
in their life cycles has increased over the postwar period so that, if we
could measure it, the distribution of lifetime incomes would show a
greater trend toward equality than the distribution of annual incomes.
It turns out, most disagreeably for students of the subject, that the
sensitivity of the distribution of income in the United States to subtle
changes in the recipient population, the definition of income, or the
choice of accounting period is extremely large—much greater in fact
than any changes we can find in inequality through time. This, I think,
is the most fundamental sense in which we can say that inequality has
been relatively constant. But it also explains the urgency of sorting out
these seemingly boring issues of definition.
Such issues will occupy the bulk of this section. But before getting
buried in the details, I pause briefly to consider a prior question: Does
the (relatively constant) postwar income distribution, with its Gini ratio
in the .40-.42 range, represent a lot of inequality or a little?
6.4.1 Is the Bottle Half Full or Half Empty?
Clearly, to paraphrase the exceedingly wise words of Rufus Miles,
where you stand on this question depends on where you sit in the in-
come distribution. While an "objective" answer is clearly out of the
question, let me attempt several ways of providing a frame of reference.
Comparisons over Time
I have already noted that changes in inequality during the postwar
period have been too small to provide useful intertemporal comparisons.
According to the Gini measure, 1957 had the most equal distribution
while 1961 had the least equal. Yet the difference between their Gini
ratios is a scant 6 percent (see also fig. 6.1). So if we want to draw
useful comparisons through time, we will have to look back further into
United States history. Naturally, the quality of the data tails off rather
quickly as we do this; but some distributions for earlier years have been
constructed. Budd (1967, introduction) has compiled more or less con-435 The Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being
sistent income distributions for several prewar and several postwar years
(see table 6.10).
2
1 The conclusion seems to be that there was substan-
tial equalization during the years of the Great Depression and World
War II, but very little change since then. The postwar distribution seems
noticeably more equal than the distribution in 1929.
Comparisons over Space
Instead of comparing the postwar income distribution of the United
States with the United States income distribution in earlier years, we
might compare the United States with other countries at the same time.
The hazard here is that different countries use different concepts of in-
come and different definitions of the recipient unit than the United
States and, as just mentioned, income distributions can be quite sensitive
to these choices. Of the many international comparisons that have been
made, two seem worth reporting here. Some years ago Irving Kravis
(1960; 1962) made a careful series of binary comparisons by taking the
income distributions of ten foreign countries and comparing each one
with a different United States distribution selected to be conceptually
alike. His conclusion was that income inequality in the United States was
rather less than in several less developed countries, but somewhere near
the middle of a group of modern industrial nations. More recently, a
study by Malcolm Sawyer for the OECD (1976) attempted to put the
distributional statistics of the various OECD nations on an equal footing
so that comparisons could be made. He found the United States and
France to have the most income inequality among OECD nations.
The overall conclusion, then, seems to be that income inequality in
the United States is higher than in many industrialized nations, but lower


























































Source: Budd (1967, table 1, p. xiii).
Note: Families and unrelated individuals, pooled. Based on Office of Business Eco-
nomics (now Bureau of Economic Analysis) income concept.
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Interpreting the 1977 Distribution
Another way to appraise the degree of inequality is to subject the
most recent data on income shares to further scrutiny along the follow-
ing lines (see table 6.11). Data for 1977 tell us that the richest fifth of
American families received eight times as much income as the poorest
fifth.
22 This 8:1 ratio, which is characteristic of the entire postwar pe-
riod, strikes me as a very substantial income gap. But some further facts
make this inequality seem less severe.
First, it turns out that richer families tend to be larger. The richest
fifth of families in 1977 actually included 28 percent more persons than
the poorest fifth. Adjusting income to a per capita basis would bring the
8:1 income ratio down to 6.25:1. Second, it turns out that the richest
fifth of families in 1977 contained 29 percent of all the wage earners in
the country, whereas the poorest fifth contained only 9.5 percent. Thus
on a per earner basis, the income ratio was only 2.6:1. And even this
ratio can be lowered by considering work effort. The richest fifth of
families supplied over 30 percent of the total weeks worked in the econ-
omy during 1977, while the poorest fifth supplied only 7.5 percent.
Thus, on a per-week-of-work basis, the income ratio between rich and




Thus we can use the very same data to show that the income gap
between the rich and the poor is anything from 8:1 to 2:1—an ambi-
guity that will make propagandists (from either side) happy. Which
ratio is "right"? I certainly do not know. On the one hand, if differ-
ences in family size are voluntary (richer parents "buy" more children),
and decisions over whether and how much to work are involuntary (due
mostly to whether jobs are available), then none of the corrections are
warranted and the 8:1 ratio seems most meaningful. On the other hand,
if we assume that people voluntarily choose their labor supply but not
Table 6.11 Characteristics of the Upper and Lower




























Source: Current Population Reports, Series P-60, no. 118,
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their family size, then all the corrections leading to a 2:1 ratio are ap-
propriate. To state the issue this way is to demonstrate its irresolvability.
Clearly, all of these choices have voluntary and involuntary aspects.
6.4.2 Demographic Changes and the Problems They Cause
I turn now to the first of our problems in interpreting the postwar
income distribution data and in accepting the conclusion that inequality
has not changed: demographic changes.
2
4 This section makes three main
points. First, demographic changes have been substantial.
2
5 Second, mea-
sured income inequality is quite sensitive to the composition of the
underlying population of recipient units. Third, many of the demo-
graphic changes that occurred were of the sort that raise measured in-
equality.
Families versus Unrelated Individuals
A logical place to start is with the division of the United States popu-
lation between families and unrelated individuals. As table 6.12 shows,
this division has changed dramatically over the postwar period, and
especially over the last decade. In this ten-year period, the population
of the United States over the age of sixteen increased 19 percent, but the
number of census families increased only 14 percent, and average family
size fell from 3.67 to 3.33 persons. By contrast, the number of unrelated
individuals grew by an astounding 75 percent in these same ten years.
These figures reflect several striking demographic trends, including a
growing propensity for both the young and the old to live apart and an
increasing incidence of broken marriages.
Table 6.13 shows why these developments are important for inter-
preting income distribution data. Unrelated individuals have always had
much lower and much more unequally distributed incomes than have
families, though there was some convergence in both respects during
the last decade. Thus the demographic shifts that underlie table 6.12,
many of which clearly represent improvements in well-being, lowered
Table 6.12 Composition of Income Units, 1947-77
1947 1957 1967 1977
Percentage of Units that are
Families 82.1 80.8 79.1 71.2
Unrelated individuals 17.9 19.2 20.9 28.8
Percentage of People in
Families 93.4 93.0 93.3 89.2
Unrelated individuals 6.6 7.0 6.7 10.8
Source: Current Population Reports, Series P-60, nos. 59,
114, 118; and Series P-20, nos. 21, 33.438 Alan S. Blinder/ Irving Kristol/Wilbur J. Cohen
average income and increased income inequality when families and un-
related individuals are pooled in a single distribution.
A first step, therefore, is to look separately at trends in the distribu-
tions among families and among unrelated individuals. These are sum-
marized in tables 6.14 and 6.15, but before considering these data one
technical point must be made (with due apologies to the casual reader).
Data on percentile shares for the years 1958 through 1977 were com-
puted in the obvious way: by ranking consumer units and adding up
Table 6.13 Comparison of Income Distributions









































Source: Current Population Reports, Series P-60, nos. 114,
118.








































































































































































































Source: Current Population Reports, Series P-60, no. 118, table 13.
their incomes. For the years 1947-57, however, the micro data required
to do this were unavailable, so shares were estimated and interpolated
from grouped data. The post-1958 data are thus more trustworthy than
the pre-1958 data, and we must keep this in mind in looking for trends.
2
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In the case of families, the data show some trend toward equality be-
fore 1957 though little since then—which raises the question of whether
we are seeing a trend or a statistical illusion. Between 1947 and 1957,
there were clear (if modest) upward trends in the shares of the second,
middle, and fourth fifths. All of these gains came at the expense of the
upper fifth (and especially the top 5 percent), whose shares declined
quite markedly. Since 1958, however, there is little trend of any kind.
The only development worth noting is the climb of the share of the
lowest fifth from the 4.5-5 percent range to around 5.5 percent during
the years 1961-66. The host of public assistance policies introduced or
expanded around that time is, of course, the leading explanation for this
improvement in the lot of poor families.
Using the Gini ratio to summarize these data, all of this can be said
more concisely by noting that, once cyclical effects are removed, the
Gini ratio exhibits a mild downward trend (about —.002 per year) until
1957 and no trend thereafter.
2
7
The story with unrelated individuals seems to have been just the re-




The share of the lowest fifth fluctuated aimlessly through 1957, appar-
ently underwent a shift (not shown in table 6.15) when the nature of
the data changed in 1958, and marched steadily upward thereafter. The
shares of the second and third fifths did very little until about 1964 and440 Alan S. Blinder/ Irving Kristol Wilbur J. Cohen
then also started to move up strongly. In total, the combined share of
the lower 60 percent of the income distribution increased from 25.4
percent to 28 percent between 1964 and 1975—a substantial improve-
ment. The upper 40 percent, naturally, were the losers. Beginning around
1960 or so, the shares of these two quintiles exhibit a noticeable down-
ward trend.
In sum, the postwar data show:
1. An equalizing trend in the family distribution until 1957 but not
after (table 6.14)
2. An equalizing trend in the distribution among unrelated individ-
uals since 1957 but not before (table 6.15)
3. A decrease in the portion of the population in families (table 6.12)
4. A widening of the income gap between families and unrelated in-
dividuals between 1947 and 1957 and a narrowing of that gap
from 1967 to 1977 (table 6.13)
All of these conflicting forces get amalgamated in the pooled distribu-
tion to produce very little overall trend despite some equalization in
both component distributions.
The Changing American Family
But we do not solve the problem of demographic change simply by
separating families from unrelated individuals. For, as we learned in
tables 6.2 and 6.3, both the composition of families and the nature of
the unrelated individuals population underwent substantial demographic
change during the postwar period. To keep the discussion manageable,
I limit myself to families in what follows. But the reader should keep in
mind that equally dramatic changes were occurring in the demography
of unrelated individuals, with corresponding effects on the income dis-
tribution.
Just what were the changes in the structure of the American family,
and how did they affect the distribution of income? We can answer these
questions with the help of table 6.2 which lists some important demo-
graphic changes, and table 6.16, which illustrates the extreme sensitivity
of income inequality to the nature of the recipient unit.
2
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Average family size was constant between 1947 and 1967, but fell
dramatically during the following ten years due to a sharp decline in the
number of children. This means that family income per capita grew
more rapidly than mean family income. The distribution of families by
size shows that most of the statistical "action" came in the two tails. At
one extreme the fraction of families with two members drifted up slowly
from 1947 to 1967, and then skyrocketed between 1967 and 1977.
3
0
At the other extreme, the number of families with six or more members
also drifted up slowly during the first two postwar decades, but then
took a nosedive between 1967 and 1977. Relative to 1947, we now have441 The Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being
Table 6.16 Gini
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Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Trends in the Income of Families and Persons
in the United States, 1947-1964, Technical Paper no. 17 (Washington, D.C.: Gov-
ernment Printing Office), tables 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 32, and 33.
1FThe Lorenz curves for three-person and six-person families cross between the
60th and 80th percentiles.
2The Lorenz curves for ages 14—24 and ages 25-34 cross between the 80th and
95th percentiles. The Lorenz curves for ages 25-34 and ages 35-44 cross between
the 40th and 60th percentiles.
more childless couples, fewer families with four children or more, and
fewer extended families. But since table 6.16 shows that the greatest
degree of inequality is found among the largest and smallest families,
it is not clear that these very large demographic shifts had much influ-
ence on the trend in inequality.
The next change in family composition worthy of note is the increased
incidence of female headship. The fraction of families headed by fe-
males, which fluctuated in a range around 10 percent from 1947 to
1967, shot up to 14.4 percent by 1977. Since female-headed families
normally have lower incomes than male-headed families, and since table
6.16 shows that they also typically have more unequally distributed in-
comes, this factor tended to retard the growth of income per family and
to increase inequality.
The farm population dwindled remarkably during the postwar period.
In 1947, more than one family in six lived on a farm. By 1977, this was
down to one family in twenty-six. It is quite likely that this migration442 Alan S. Blinder/ Irving Kristol/Wilbur J. Cohen
from the farm reduced income inequality because farm incomes are
much more unequally distributed than nonfarm incomes (see table 6.16)
and because farm incomes are typically much lower than nonfarm in-
comes. However, there is a complication that bears mentioning. Census
money income excludes income received in kind, which is probably far
more important on farms than elsewhere. Since census data therefore
overstate the gap between farm and nonfarm incomes, they probably
also overstate the equalization caused by the migration from rural areas.
The age structure of families (as measured by the age of the family
head) also changed dramatically. Between 1947 and 1977, the number
of young (under 25) and old (65 and over) families grew much faster
than the number in the prime earning years, ages 35-64 (table 6.2).
Given the facts that families at the extremes of the age distribution al-
ways have much lower incomes than those in the middle and that the
income distribution among the elderly is quite unequal (table 6.16), this
development pushed inequality up.
3
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In summary, the changing age-sex composition of family heads pushed
the distribution of income toward greater inequality while the movement
off the farm pushed in the opposite direction. In addition, there were a
host of other demographic changes, some of which may have had sub-
stantial effects on measured income inequality. Indeed, given the extreme
sensitivity of income inequality to demography that table 6.16 docu-
ments, it is somewhat amazing that the distribution of income among
families changed so little during a period when the demographic struc-
ture changed so much.
6.4.3 Measured Inequality and the Income Concept
It has already been mentioned that the concept of income used by the
Census Bureau is far from ideal. Two obvious questions follow. First, if
we could measure income better, would inequality appear less than in
the official data? Second, if we could measure income better, would a
stronger trend toward equality emerge? This section answers both of
these questions in the affirmative.
3
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Specifically, this section deals with five potential improvements in the
census income concept: subtracting personal taxes, adding in transfers
in kind, adding in other types of income in kind, including capital gains,
and correcting for underreporting of income. In addition, the influence
of cash transfers on inequality is examined. As in the previous section,
we shall see that changes in the definition of income typically cause
changes in measured inequality that exceed anything we can find in the
time series.
Personal Taxes
We can probably make sense of an income distribution that excludes
both public transfer payments and taxes or one that includes both. But443 The Level and Distribution of Economic Weil-Being
census income is an awkward halfway house which includes transfers
but fails to deduct taxes. Thus a first step in improving the census in-
come concept is to subtract personal taxes.
3
3 In practice, most studies
have deducted only federal taxes, thus leaving state income taxes in the
alleged "posttax" income figures.
34 The federal income tax is decidedly
progressive. The payroll tax, while regressive relative to earnings, is not
quite so regressive relative to income because low income groups receive
a large proportion of their total income in transfers. Deducting both
income and payroll taxes thus decreases measured inequality noticeably,
as table 6.17 shows.
3
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A similar study by Taussig (1973), using 1967 data and an income
concept similar to census income, reported that federal personal taxes
reduced the Gini coefficient from .376 to .361. It seems unlikely that
including state and local income taxes would change these figures very
much, but including sales, excise, and property taxes might.
361 conclude
that the distribution of posttax income in any one year is moderately
more equal than the distribution of pretax income. The difference, how-
ever, is not dramatic.
Because personal taxes have grown faster than pretax income (table
6.5), it seems obvious that subtracting them from census income each
year would increase the trend toward equality. Yet a careful study of the
1950-70 period by Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) belies this suppo-
sition. They conclude instead that while taxes equalized the distribution
of any one year, taxes had almost no effect on the trend in inequality
of aftertax income.
3
7 Why the discrepancy? Reynolds and Smolensky
(1977) show that federal personal taxes became less progressive between
1950 and 1970 for several reasons, the most important of which were
(a) the increasing importance of the payroll tax relative to the income
tax and (b) the decreasing progressivity of the income tax.
Transfers in Kind
Recent years have witnessed a sharp controversy, both in academic
journals and in the popular press, over the extent to which adding trans-
fers in kind to income would change the portrait of inequality in post-
Table 6.17 Effect of Federal Personal Taxes on the
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war America. The controversy is over the quantitative dimensions of the
effect, not its qualitative direction, since no one disputes that (a) trans-
fers in kind have grown much faster than factor incomes
3
8 and (b) the
distribution of transfers in kind is much more favorable to the poor than
the distribution of factor incomes. These undisputed facts are enough
to conclude that more equality in any given year and a stronger trend
toward equality would emerge if the distribution of income were adjusted
to include transfers in kind. But how much more?
The reason for the controversy boils down to this. While it is straight-
forward to estimate the total volume of in-kind programs such as food
stamps, public housing, public education, and medical services provided
under Medicare and Medicaid, it is not quite so straightforward to dis-
tribute these totals among income groups. And it is even more difficult
to decide how to price them out. Treating a dollar spent on a transfer
in kind as equivalent to a dollar received in cash seems inappropriate
unless the transfer in kind provides precisely what the consumer would
have used the extra cash to purchase. However, there are two cases
in which transfers in kind are just as good as cash.
3
9 The first is when
the government provides goods that the consumer would otherwise have
purchased anyway and provides less of them than the consumer would
have bought for herself. In this case, the transfer in kind does not affect
budget allocation decisions and is equivalent to a cash transfer. Food
stamps come close to fitting this pattern; it is arguable whether Medicare
and Medicaid do. However, it seems clear that public education and
public housing are not of this character. The second case is where the
good that is distributed can be resold with insubstantial transactions
costs (e.g., a transferable ration coupon). It is clear, however, that few,
if any, public programs fit this second model.
Apart from these exceptional cases, it is conceptually clear that trans-
fers in kind are worth less to recipients than what they cost to provide.
4
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But how much less? This question can only be answered by positing
some utility function and assessing the cash equivalent (in utility terms)
of each transfer in kind. An excellent recent study by Smolensky et al.
(1977) did precisely this, and concluded that the cash equivalent of one
dollar in either food stamps or rent supplements was essentially one
dollar, but that one dollar spent on either public housing or Medicare/
Medicaid was worth substantially less than one dollar to recipients.
4
1
Table 6.18 summarizes the results of two conflicting studies of the
effects of transfers in kind on the distribution of income in 1972, under
the (possibly false) assumption that such transfers should be valued at
full cost. The adjustment adds between 1.8 and 2.3 percentage points
to the share of the poorest fifth of families, depending on whose assump-
tions about the volume and distribution of noneducational transfers we445 The Level and Distribution of Economic Weil-Being
Table 6.18 Effect of Transfers in Kind on the Distri-
bution of Income among Families, 1978
Income Concept
1. Census income
2. Census income plus
educational transfers


























2 and subtracts a like amount from the share of the richest fifth.
These are substantial changes. However, the increment to the share of
the lowest fifth would be reduced by about one-half percentage point if
transfers in kind were valued at 70 percent of cost instead.
4
3
We are thus far from agreement over how large the effect of transfers
in kind has been on the postwar trend toward equality. After a series of
papers by Browning (1976; 1979) and Smeeding (1979a; 1979b), air-
ing this and a number of other issues, it appears (Smeeding 1979b) that
Browning's adjustments (including one for transfers in kind) raise the
share of the lowest fifth of families in 1972 from 5.4 percent in the raw
data all the way to 8.5 percent. Smeeding's corrections, by contrast,
raise it only to 6.5 percent. The difference is hardly inconsequential,
though only part of it traces to their divergent treatments of transfers
in kind.
Cash Transfers
This seems an appropriate time to ask how large an equalizing effect
cash transfers have had on the distribution of income. Unlike the other
concerns of this section, this does not constitute a "correction" of census
income, since census income already includes cash transfers; but the
issue seems important enough to merit special attention.
By how much do cash transfers reduce income inequality in any given
year? A number of studies have tried to answer this question, with rela-
tively good agreement that cash transfers have decreased the Gini ratio
by about 12 percent in recent years.
4
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that the equalizing impact of cash transfers is much greater than that of
taxes. The study by Smolensky et al. (1977) enables us to compare the
equalizing effects of cash and in-kind transfers with the following results:
Reduction in the Gini Ratio
From cash transfers —.046
From in-kind transfers:
valued at full cost —.027
valued at cash equivalent — .016
Clearly cash transfers are much more important as equalizers, even if
transfers in kind (including educational transfers) are valued on a dollar
for dollar basis. If we adjust for the estimated lower value of certain
transfers in kind, the predominance of cash transfers is even clearer.
I conclude that cash transfers are a very major source of income
equality—substantially more important than either personal taxes or
transfers in kind. The equalization is accomplished mainly by raising the
incomes of the lowest fifth. But what of the trend in inequality? As table
6.4 shows, transfers have become an increasingly important source of
income since 1957, and especially since 1967. We also know that the
lower income strata receive a disproportionately large share of these
transfers.
4
5 Thus it is clear that cash transfers pushed the distribution
of income in the direction of greater equality during the postwar period.
For example, Danziger and Plotnick (1977) estimated that transfer pay-
ments reduced the Gini coefficient by .069 (or 14.4 percent) in 1974
compared to only .048 (or 11 percent) in 1965.
While this is a noticeable effect over so short a period of time, it is
surprising that the explosive growth of transfers did not push inequality
down even faster. Three reasons suggest themselves. First, transfer pay-
ments may create disincentives for earning income that disequalize the
distribution of factor income. Second, these transfer payments may have
helped finance the splitting up of family units that led to increasing
inequality. Third, Reynolds and Smolensky (1978) have suggested that
transfers and other government programs follow a typical life-cycle pat-
tern that dulls their initial redistributive thrust. Specifically, as redistrib-
utive programs mature and reach a wider clientele, their benefits become
less concentrated on the poor. Thus, as the benefits from these programs
grow larger in the aggregate, they simultaneously start to be distributed
in a manner less favorable to the poor.
Other Income in Kind
Transfers in kind have already been discussed, but some factor pay-
ments are also made in kind rather than in cash. Major items here in-447 The Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being
elude food and lodging consumed by farmers and farm workers, fringe
benefits that are either partially or totally subsidized by employers (e.g.,
medical insurance, company cars), and the benefits that many self-
employed individuals siphon out of their businesses (unbeknownst to
the tax collector). On balance, it is quite unclear to me whether includ-
ing this potpourri of items would increase or decrease measured in-
equality in any given year, though both Schultz (1975) and Henle (1972)
have speculated that they are disequalizing. There are no studies that
shed much light on this issue.
4
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Nonetheless, I would still hazard a guess that, were we able to mea-
sure it, the addition of (nontransfer) income in kind to the CPS data
would lead to a more disequalizing trend. One reason is that food and
lodging consumed on farms (which is distributed more favorably for
the poor) has declined as a fraction of all income in kind, while fringe
benefits (which are distributed in a more prorich pattern) have in-
creased dramatically. Another reason was mentioned earlier: the farm/
nonfarm income differential is exaggerated by omission of income in
kind.
Capital Gains
It has often been suggested that the CPS understates the degree of
income inequality because it excludes capital gains—which accrue al-
most exclusively to the rich. And the one scrap of evidence we have on
this issue supports this idea. When Smeeding (1979a) distributed an
aggregate of accrued capital gains constructed by Browning (1976)
among families for the year 1972,
4
7 he found that the share of the high-
est fifth increased by 1.4 percentage points.
I am dubious about the value of this exercise because many, indeed
most, capital gains are not gains of real purchasing power, but simply
represent maintenance (or rather partial maintenance) of principle in
an inflationary world. Obviously, if the inflation rate is 8 percent, a fifty
dollar stock must increase four dollars per year just to maintain its real
value. These four-dollar increments, if they occur, are not gains in real
terms. A careful study by Eisner (1980) shows that over the 1946-77
period as a whole, the more than three trillion dollars in nominal capital
gains that households received failed (by a very small margin) to pro-
vide compensation for inflation. "Real" capital gains, in a word, were as
often losses as gains.
Because of the extremely prorich pattern by which capital gains are
distributed, it is clear that their inclusion would disequalize the income
distribution in any year for which aggregate real gains are positive (as
Smeeding and Browning found). But it is equally clear that including
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which aggregate real gains are negative. Since gains were roughly zero
in an "average" postwar year, I conclude that the omission of capital
gains in the CPS data is not misleading on average, though it does con-
ceal some sizable variations in inequality from year to year.
What of the trend? Eisner's (1980, table 33) data on real capital
gains as a fraction of disposable income show violent fluctuations but
absolutely no trend.
4
8 It is thus highly unlikely that the omission of
capital gains distorts our picture of the postwar trend in income in-
equality.
Underreporting of Income
The CPS is plagued by underreporting of all sorts of income. But the
two biggest underreporting problems come at opposite ends of the in-
come distribution: transfer payments (which are received mainly by the
poor) and property income (which is received mainly by the rich). As
a consequence, a correction for underreporting would raise the incomes
of both the poor and the rich relative to the middle class, making it
unclear whether measured inequality would rise or fall. What a series of
such corrections might do to the postwar trend in inequality is totally
obscure.
Summary
Table 6.19 summarizes this section by bringing together estimates,
many of them admittedly dubious, of the effects on the distribution of
income of all the adjustments discussed here.
4
9 The overall conclusion
seems to be that patching up the census income concept probably would
lead to a distribution of income with noticeably more equality in any
one year but only a slightly stronger trend toward equality over the post-
war period as a whole.
While there is a good deal of guesswork involved, it is conceivable
that all the adjustments together might reduce the level of the Gini ratio
by about .050 in any one year—a change which exceeds by far the
difference between the highest and lowest Gini ratios recorded in table
6.14. For the share of the poorest fifth of families, it is clear that trans-
fers in kind are the most important adjustment, though personal taxes
and underreporting also matter. For the share of the richest fifth of
families, transfers in kind, personal taxes, and (in some years) capital
gains, are all quite important.
Where the trend in inequality is concerned, all the adjustments to-
gether seem likely to lead to more equalization through time, mainly
because of transfers in kind. However, the effects of improving the in-
come definition seem unlikely to be as strong as the effects of the
demographic changes discussed in the previous section.449 The Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being
6.4.4 Measured Inequality and the Accounting Period
It is clear that the distribution of income would look more equal if
income were measured over an accounting period longer than a year
because: (1) some year-to-year fluctuations would be "smoothed out";
and (2) part of the inequality in any one year's income distribution is
due to the fact that people are at different stages of their life cycles, and
income varies systematically by age.
It is not obvious, however, that these considerations have much bear-
ing on the trend in inequality. The fact that there are transitory income
fluctuations will distort our picture of the trend only if the variability
of income has increased or decreased systematically over time. It is far
from evident that this is true. Similarly, the fact that life-cycle influences
contribute to measured inequality will alter the trend only if these life-
cycle influences have grown more (or less) important over time. Here,
however, it has been claimed that this is in fact the case—that the gap
between annual income inequality and lifetime income inequality has
increased over the postwar period (Paglin 1975). An examination of
this controversy is the major task of this section.
Transitory Income Fluctuations
The natural approach to correcting for transitory fluctuations in in-
come is to follow households through time and average their incomes
Table 6.19 Effects of Adjustments
Distribution of Income
Adjustment
1. Subtract Personal Taxes
2. Add In-Kind Transfers
At full value
At 70% value
3. Add other Income in Kind
4. Add Capital Gains




































Note: n.a. = not available.
a+ sign means the correction would increase the trend toward equality. — sign




dFrom Smolensky et al. (1977).
eComputed by author from data in Smeeding (1979a) and Browning (1979). Both
educational and noneducational in-kind transfers are included. Since the two
sources disagree on the latter, their estimates have been averaged.
'Calculated by the author from data in Smeeding (1979a).450 Alan S. Blinder/Irving Kristol/Wilbur J. Cohen
over multiyear periods. Up until quite recently, there was a dearth of
data with which to do this. Kravis (1962) had studied a panel of house-
holds for five years between 1949 and 1954, finding inequality (as mea-
sured by the Gini ratio) over five years to be about 10 percent less than
inequality in a single year. He had also examined twelve years of Dela-
ware tax returns (1925-36), and found the twelve-year Gini ratio to be
8 percent lower than the average of the one-year Gini ratios.
The availability of several panel studies in the United States in recent
years has verified Kravis's findings. Various sets of panel data have been
used by Benus and Morgan (1975), Kohen, Parnes, and Shea (1975),
Hoffman and Podder (1976), David and Menchik (1979) and others
to reach the following general conclusions.
1. Gini ratios for income over three years generally are about 3-5
percent lower than Gini ratios for one year,
5
0 though reductions as large
as 10 percent have been found.
5
1
2. If we stretch the accounting period to seven years, the drop in the
Gini ratio increases to 9 percent, even if we restrict attention to families
with the same head throughout the period (Hoffman and Podder 1976).
3. Because of the specific way it weights reductions in inequality at
various points on the Lorenz curve, the Gini ratio seems to decline less




If these sound like small adjustments, it should be remembered that
a 10 percent decline in the Gini ratio (e.g., from .360 to .324) is abso-
lutely colossal compared to anything we can find in the time series data
(see table 6.14).
Life-Cycle Influences
It is clear that inequality over the lifetime is lower than inequality in
any one year, but here the absence of hard data makes it necessary to
resort to simulation and estimation techniques.
My simulation study (Blinder 1974) "guesstimated" that inequality
in lifetime income was about 30 percent lower than inequality in a single
year if the Gini measure was used, but about 40-45 percent lower if the
coefficient of variation was used to measure inequality.
5
3 Lillard (1977)
estimated that the Gini ratio for lifetime earnings was about 45 percent
less than that for annual earnings in a very special group of American
men. Gordon (1976) estimated that for a sample of white male heads
of households between thirty and fifty-five years of age, the share of
the lowest fifth in lifetime income was 8.7 percent, compared to 6.7
percent in annual income. Without actual data, it is hard to know how
accurate these estimates are.
5
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Our best guess is thus that the difference between lifetime inequality
and annual inequality is very great. But is this important for interpreting451 The Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being
the postwar trend in inequality? To answer this, think of a population
composed of different age groups. Inequality can increase if: (1) in-
equality within age groups increases; (2) the distribution of families
across age groups shifts toward groups with greater inequality; or (3)
income differences by age become more pronounced.
5
5
What do the data tell us about each of these factors?
1. Data covering 1947-64 reveal only weak downward trends in age-
specific Gini ratios.
5
6 Danziger, Haveman, and Smolensky (1977) found
that if all age-specific Gini ratios had been constant at their 1965 levels,
the Gini ratio for 1972 would have been (very slightly) lower than it
was. Thus it seems that factor (1) was operative, but very weak.
2. As noted earlier (see page 442 and table 6.2), changes in the age
structure of families were substantial and disequalizing. Over 1965-72,
Danziger, Haveman, and Smolensky (1977) found that the shifting age
distribution added .011 to the Gini coefficient (which increased in total
by .016). Blinder and Esaki (1978) created a time series of hypotheti-
cal income distributions covering 1947-74 on the counterfactual as-
sumption that the age distribution did not change. They found that the
effect of the shifting age distribution on quintile shares, while disequal-
izing, was very modest.
3. The data do show an increased arching in the age-income profile,
as figure 6.3 illustrates.
5
7 Danziger, Haveman, and Smolensky (1977)
attributed a .005 increase in the Gini ratio between 1965 and 1972 to
this factor. We lack a study of this factor over a longer period of time.
On balance, it seems clear that the shifting age distribution and the
increased curvature of the age-income profile have caused income in-
equality to increase during the postwar period despite small declines
in age-specific inequality. But the magnitude of the effect seems modest.
Yet, in a controversial paper, Paglin (1975) claimed that the shifting
age distribution counteracted what would otherwise have been a very
strong trend toward greater income equality among families. Whereas
the raw data (see table 6.14) show rather little downward trend in in-
come inequality between 1947 and 1972 (a 4 percent decline in the Gini
ratio), Gini ratios that Paglin (1975) presented as "corrected" for age
factors exhibit a very strong downward trend (dropping 21 percent). It
behooves us to examine Paglin's calculations. Is his method a valid way
to "remove" the influence of the changing age structure from the data?
Paglin's technique for decomposing the Gini ratio is straightforward.
Begin by constructing a hypothetical Lorenz curve on the assumption
that all families of the same age (as defined by the family head) have
the same income, and use the area between this hypothetical Lorenz
curve and the actual Lorenz curve (shaded in fig. 6.4) as a measure of
inequality due to factors other than the life cycle. This simple decompo-
sition seems appealing at first, but does not survive closer examination.
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Fig. 6.3 Age-income profiles for families.
Pyatt (1976), and before him Bhattacharya and Mahalanobis (1967),
have shown that the Gini ratio can be decomposed into three compo-
nents (not two): (a) a weighted average of the age-specific Gini ratios
(or of any other desired grouping), (b) a part dependent on the differ-
ences in average incomes across age groups, and (c) a part due to the
overlapping of the groups.
5
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Paglin is presumably interested in isolating (a), but by subtracting
term (b), he is actually left with parts (a) and (c). Since part (c) has
no intuitive interpretation, the Paglin measure of age-corrected inequal-
ity can exhibit strange behavior, as Danziger, Haveman, and Smolensky
(1977) have shown. In terms of the three age-related factors enumer-
ated in section 6.4.4, Paglin's procedure does not succeed in isolating
factor (1), the effects of changing inequality within specific age groups.
I conclude that while Paglin's basic point—that postwar changes in
life-cycle influences on income distribution have masked some of the453 The Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being
trend toward equality—is correct, he has probably exaggerated its quan-
titative significance.
Income Equality versus Income Mobility
A related point should be dealt with here. There is considerable
churning within the income distribution from year to year. The same
families do not, for example, always populate the bottom fifth or the top
5 percent. If our real concern (for welfare purposes) is with income
inequality over some lengthy period of time, then it is clear that we can
get a good degree of equality in either of two ways:
1. Families could occupy essentially the same relative positions year
after year, but the annual distribution (and hence the multiyear distribu-
tion) could be quite equal.
2. The annual distribution of income could be quite unequal, but
families could move around within the distribution so much that the
multiyear distribution of income could be quite equal.
In this sense, income equality and income mobility are substitutes for
one another.
6
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bility occupies a more exalted place in the American constellation of
value judgments than does equality. Americans seem quite willing to
tolerate gross disparities in incomes so long as there is a reasonable
chance that low-income families in one year can become high-income
families in another year. With very little mobility, on the other hand,
even a Gini ratio of .300 might be considered intolerable.
The studies cited earlier, and several others as well, seem to suggest
a good deal of mobility in the United States income distribution—espe-
cially near the bottom of the distribution (Mirer 1975; Benus 1974)
and among the young (Kohen, Parnes, and Shea 1975). To cite just one
summary statistic, Lane and Morgan (1975) found that the rank corre-
lation for family money income between years one and six of the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics was only .47 (or .64 among families with
the same head in the two years). While ghetto dwellers rarely trade
places with Rockefellers, ours is not a stratified society.
6.5 Special Aspects of Income Inequality
Social scientists and philosophers have long been intrigued by issues
relating to equality in the abstract. Laymen and political figures, by
contrast, have shown rather less interest in equality than in such related
(and more concrete) issues as the plight of the poor, income differen-
tials by race, and income differentials by sex. Each of these special
aspects of income inequality has been the focus of a major public policy
initiative during the postwar period. For these reasons, each of them
merits special attention.
6.5.1 The Special Problem of Poverty
As just noted, the revealed political preferences of the American
public show much less concern with inequality than with the plight of
the inhabitants of the lower tail of the distribution—the poor. As Lamp-
man (1973) has remarked, this country has never set a target for the
Gini ratio. It has, however, declared war on poverty and set specific
targets for its reduction. Who is winning the War on Poverty?
Defining Poverty
It turns out, however, not to be so easy to separate the specific prob-
lem of poverty from the more general problem of income inequality.
6
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The reason is clear enough. Income is a continuous variable, whose
distribution can be estimated. Poverty, however, is a dichotomous vari-
able: a family is either poor or it is nonpoor. To decide who is poor, we
must place a "poverty line" somewhere in the income distribution, as
depicted in figure 6.5, and count how many families (or people) fall







Fig. 6.5 Defining the poverty population.
At one extreme, we could base our poverty line on a purely absolute
standard of poverty: a family is deemed poor if and only if its income
is insufficient to purchase a prescribed bundle of goods and services.
Since the bundle is fixed, the poverty line is increased only to adjust for
inflation. This concept of poverty, which underlies the official poverty
counts of the United States government, has been criticized on many
grounds.
1. It seems to contradict public notions of what constitutes poverty.
This point is obvious when we consider long periods of time: the rich
of centuries ago lacked many of the conveniences that today's poor
routinely have. But section 6.3, above, showed how dramatic changes
in the standard of living have been even over a period as short as thirty
years. It would be surprising indeed if the concept of poverty had not
changed accordingly, and evidence from public opinion polls and else-
where suggests that it has.
6
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2. The bundle of goods and services is inherently arbitrary. Who
knows what items every family must have if it is not to be deemed
"poor"? Answers to this question are arbitrary at best. Official defini-456 Alan S. Blinder/Irving Kristol/Wilbur J. Cohen
tions of poverty in the United States are essentially obtained by defining
a food budget and tripling it.
6
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3. It is clear that economic growth will eventually pull almost every-
one above any purely absolute poverty line. This definition seems to
make the War on Poverty too easy to win.
The unexceptionable idea that what constitutes poverty is culturally,
not biologically, determined leads us away from a purely absolute stan-
dard of poverty. But where do we stop? We could go all the way to a
purely relative standard and define the poor as the lowest 20 percent of
the income distribution. Under this definition, the War on Poverty would
be unwinnable by definition; and the Bible would be literally correct:
ye have the poor always with you. Personally, I find this to be not an
unattractive definition of poverty. However, it does require that we
amend the poverty-reduction goal. Counting the poor will no longer do;
instead, it is natural to study trends in the share of total income received
by the lowest 20 percent. This, of course, has been done at length in this
chapter. By this definition, the "special" problem of poverty has already
been considered; the conclusion was that poverty has been eroding—
but slowly.
There are, of course, intermediate grounds between purely absolute
and purely relative standards of poverty. Poverty lines based on "mini-
mum decency" budgets recognize psychological as well as physical needs,
and are periodically adjusted to reflect changing norms and mores. Be-
tween adjustments, of course, they function just like fixed budgets and
so are close cousins to strictly absolute definitions of poverty. They also
share the arbitrariness of the fixed budget standard.
6
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A different intermediate choice comes much closer to the purely rela-
tive concept of poverty: define the poor as those families with incomes
below x percent of the median. Fuchs (1967) suggested such a standard
with x = 50. While this definition allows the poverty population to
shrink or expand in principle, in practice it has amounted to defining
the poor as the lowest 20 percent (Fuchs 1967, p. 89).
Not Again!
A related set of points is worth making here. If we are to enumerate
the poor, we must decide what types of recipient units to count (fam-
ilies? persons?), we must select a definition of income, and we must pick
an accounting period. This all sounds familiar. The issues and problems
are exactly the same as in our lengthy discussion of income inequality
—and so is the sensitivity of the poverty count to the choices we make.
Official poverty counts, it should be noted, are based on census income
—a concept which, we have seen, apparently hides an upward trend (of
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shifts studied earlier are also worth recalling, since many of them have
served to increase the poverty population under official definitions. Fi-
nally there is the accounting period. Official poverty counts make no
attempt to distinguish those who are permanently poor from those who
are temporarily poor (owing, for example, to a large capital loss).
6
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Given the amount of mobility that has been found at the lower end of
the income distribution, this may be an important problem.
Who Are the Poor?
Having said all this, let us see who the official data classify as poor.
According to the latest data (for 1977), 9.3 percent of all families and
22.6 percent of all unrelated individuals fell below the official poverty
lines. Persons in families constituted about 80 percent of the poor, and
almost half of these were in families headed by a female—a female
headship ratio far higher than that for the population as a whole. The
poverty rate was only 5.5 percent for male-headed families, but thirty-
two percent for female-headed families. Among poor unrelated individ-
uals, almost two-thirds were female.
6
6 Relative to the population as a
whole, the poor were also more frequently black, less educated, and
lived in larger families.
6
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Alternative definitions of income or concepts of poverty give rather
different poverty counts, however. Table 6.20, for example, shows how
the fraction of persons classified as poor changes as we adjust either the
income concept or the definition of poverty. The upper left-hand entry
is the official poverty count for 1976: just under 12 percent of all per-
sons were considered poor. A relative poverty definition
6
8 raises the
count to 15.4 percent of the population—a 30 percent increase in the
number of poor people. Altering the definition of income by deducting
direct taxes, adding income in kind, and correcting for underreporting
(which, we know, is very serious for transfer income) cuts the poverty
count drastically—to only 6.5 percent.
Table 6.20 The Poverty Count for 1976, by Different Definitions
(Percentage of All Persons)
Census Census Income Census Income
Income Adjusted
1 Minus Transfers
Official Poverty Lines 11.8 6.5 21.0
Relative Poverty Standard
2 15.4 — 24.1
Source: Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick 1979, table 5, p. 31.
1 Adjusted for income in kind (both transfers and otherwise), direct taxes, and
underreporting by Smeeding (1977).
2Defines poor persons as those with income below 44 percent of the median income.458 Alan S. Blinder/Irving Kristol/Wilbur J. Cohen
Trends in Poverty Counts
How has the poverty count behaved through time? Figure 6.6 plots
four different estimates. The official data, using census income and an
absolute definition of poverty, show rapid progress against poverty from
1959 (when the data begin) until 1969. Thereafter, the fraction of
families who are classified as poor almost levels off (it is 9.7 percent in
1969 and 9.3 percent in 1977), while the fraction of unrelated indi-
viduals so classified continues to tumble. The other two series use per-
sons as the recipient unit, and are available only since 1965 (and not
for every year). There is no discernible trend in relative poverty based
on census money income. Absolute poverty based on income adjusted
for taxes, in-kind income, and underreporting does show a downward
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The conclusion, then, seems to run something like this. The official
poverty count declined smartly through the 1960s, but has been stagnant
since then. This constancy, however, is due to the dominant position of
families in the aggregate; the incidence of poverty among unrelated
individuals continued to fall. If we fix up some of the pitfalls with census
income, there appears to have been considerably more progress in the
War on Poverty. But if we adopt a relative poverty concept rather than
the official poverty lines, there has been much less.
One final word seems in order. Whether we use official poverty lines
or a relative poverty concept, table 6.20 shows that many fewer people
are poor after (cash) transfers than before transfers. The trends in pre-
and posttransfer poverty are also quite different. By official definitions,
the poverty rate for all persons declined 24.4 percent between 1965 and
1976. But, there is almost no trend in the poverty rate based on income
minus (cash) transfers (Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick 1979, table
5, p. 31). Transfers, in a word, have been the chief weapon in the War
on Poverty.
6.5.2 Black-White Income Differentials
It is, of course, well known that nonwhite individuals and families
typically have lower incomes than whites.
7
0 For example, the ratio of
mean income among nonwhite families and unrelated individuals to that
among whites averaged .589 (with standard deviation .057) for the post-
war period as a whole.
However, there was a substantial narrowing of the differential during
the period. Figure 6.7 charts the behavior of the nonwhite/white income
ratio since 1947, for families and unrelated individuals pooled. The
upward trend from .52 in 1947 to .68 in 1975 is clear and unmistakable,
though there has been some slippage since then. The gains scored by
blacks between 1965 and 1968 are particularly impressive.
7
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The economic position of blacks relative to whites is far from uniform
across different demographic groups. In 1977, for example, the black/
white mean income ratio was .63 when averaged over all families. But
for families with a head aged 18-24, it was .97 while for families headed
by a 55-64 year old it was .57. Similarly, the ratio was .76 for male-
headed families versus .64 for female-headed families.
Several demographic forces limited the economic gains achieved by
blacks, however. First, there was a substantial increase in the fraction
of families headed by females—which rose from 28 percent in 1967 to
37 percent by 1976.
7
2 Second, the labor force participation rate of black
men declined somewhat—from 85 percent in 1954 to 71 percent in
1977, with much of the drop accounted for by the elderly (see Richard
Freeman, chap. 5 of this volume). This occurred despite an increase in460 Alan S. Blinder/Irving Kristol/Wilbur J. Cohen
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Fig. 6.7 Trend in nonwhite/white mean income ratio, for families
and unrelated individuals.
black earning rates relative to those of whites. However, relative earn-
ings gains were greater for women than for men. Indeed, something
close to full parity between the races was achieved among females work-
ing full time full year. The black/white earnings ratio for such workers
rose from .56 in 1955 to .93 in 1977.
7
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Thus the improvement in the black/white income ratio was the net
result of a confluence of forces, some of which were equalizing and
some of which were disequalizing. On balance, however, there can be
no question that the relative economic position of blacks improved sub-461 The Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being
stantially during the postwar years. Equally clear is the fact that—except
in isolated instances—parity has not yet been achieved.
6.5.3 Male-Female Income Differentials
When we come to consider income differentials between men and
women (or between male- and female-headed families) a rather differ-
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incomes dropped from 48 percent just after World War II to only 40
percent by 1960, hovered in a narrow range between 40 percent and 41
percent between 1960 and 1969, and rose in recent years to 44 percent.
Part of this huge income differential—which is wider than that be-
tween blacks and whites—is due to the fact that more women than men
work part time or for only part of each year. But figure 6.8 shows that
even women who worked full time for a full year typically had incomes
only about 55 percent as large as those of their male counterparts.
(Earnings differentials show much the same pattern.) Differentials in
incomes between male- and female-headed families paint an even more
pessimistic picture. Female-headed families averaged 73 percent of the
income of male-headed families in 1947, but only 50 percent in 1977.
Indeed, as Lampman (1977) has remarked, the lack of progress in
narrowing male-female differentials is almost unique in a period when
black-white, North-South and other differentials were being reduced.
The sharp increase in female labor force participation rates suggests
itself as the leading explanation of this lack of progress, although that




6.6 Trends in Nonincome Aspects of Economic Well-Being
This section seeks to remedy some of the omissions caused by the
myopic concentration thus far on income as the measure of well-being.
The discussion is necessarily less systematic, less quantitative, and more
impressionistic than the discussion of income.
6.6.1 Leisure Time
When an economist is asked to go beyond income as a measure of
economic well-being, the first thing he thinks of is leisure. (Indeed, this
is often also the last thing he thinks of.) It would seem that if two indi-
viduals have the same wage rate
7
5 but earn different incomes because
they voluntarily work different hours, then the best first guess is that
they are equally well off. Income inequality that arises from voluntary




Leisure time can be expanded in several ways. The number of hours
worked per week can shrink.
7
7 The number of (full-time equivalent)
weeks per year can decline because of longer vacations and more paid
holidays. Or the number of years of retirement can be increased. As we
shall see, each of these factors has been operative during the postwar
period. I begin with hours of work.463 The Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being
Hours of Work per Week
It is, of course, well known that the work week has shrunk over the
long sweep of history. Indeed, the extent of this shrinkage is often exag-
gerated. We have probably all heard stories about how a work week of
six or seven twelve-hour days was "typical" around the turn of the cen-
tury. But the data belie these grisly tales. The average manufacturing
worker at the turn of the century apparently worked about six ten-hour
days per week—an average work week of fifty-nine hours.
7
8 Hours out-
side of manufacturing were typically shorter yet, so the average worker
in all industries worked only fifty-three hours (Moore and Hedges
1971). From 1900 to 1947 there was a steady downward trend in the




It is often claimed that the decline in the typical work week ended
around World War II, and that since then American workers have taken
their increased leisure in the form of fewer weeks per year. This widely
held view derives from looking only at hours per week in manufacturing,
which by 1977 accounted for just 24 percent of total employment. Here
the decline in the work week did indeed halt: it was 40.3 hours long in
1977. But more than three-quarters of the United States labor force
works in other industries; and in these industries the decline in the aver-
age work week has continued throughout the postwar period, perhaps
because of the increased use of part-time workers (see table 6.21). I
conclude that American workers decreased their average work week by
about 10 percent during the postwar period. Manufacturing workers (a
shrinking minority) were a notable exception.
Weeks of Work per Year
Data are scarcer for the number of work weeks (or days) in a year.
Lebergott (1976, p. 91) reports that the percent of nonfarm workers
taking vacations increased from nearly zero in 1930 to 60 percent in
1950 and 80 percent in 1970. He also cites U.S. Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics data that the typical American worker had seven paid holidays.
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spreading incidence of vacations and paid holidays may have reduced
the typical work year by two weeks (about 4 percent) or more.
Incidence of Retirement
Another remarkable development of the postwar period has been the
increasing prevalence of retirement, especially for men.
8
0 The labor force
participation rate for men 65 years of age and older fell from 47.8
percent in 1947 to only 20.1 percent in 1977; for men aged 55-64, the
decline was from 89.6 percent to 74 percent.
8
1 Reimers (1976) com-
pared men who reached age 65 around 1933 with men who reached
age 65 around 1963 and concluded that the younger generation devoted
about 2 percent fewer years of its life to work than did the older gen-
eration.
It takes more than a little chutzpah to combine this guesstimate with
my seat-of-the-pants estimate that more vacations decreased the work
year by about 4 percent, and with data showing a 10 percent decline in
the average work week. But, if we do all this, we are led to conclude
that working time over a typical career has decreased about 16 percent
during the postwar period. While this is a substantial amount, it prob-
ably means that leisure time expanded more slowly than the consump-
tion of market goods and services.
8
2 Evidence that leisure time is a
luxury good is lacking.
Housework
There is, however, one other important aspect of declining work effort
that ought not to escape our attention. Lebergott (1976) has estimated
that the typical housewife spent about twelve hours on housework per
day in 1900, but only five hours in 1966. Stafford and Duncan (1977)
cite data from time diaries showing that married women spent about
twenty-seven hours per week on work in the home. How much of this
decline in the housewife's workday took place since World War II is not
known. But if we attribute half of the eight-hour-per-day decline to the
postwar period, then the postwar decline in the workday for housewives
would be about 50 percent. This may be an overestimate,
8
3 but it does
seem that housewives have improved their lot relative to paid workers
in the postwar period.
8
4 Family leisure thus probably increased faster
than leisure time of the principal breadwinner.
8
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The Valuation of Leisure
How much is this increasing leisure worth? There seem to be two
basic approaches to the valuation of leisure time, though each has many
variants. The first approach tacitly or explicitly posits a utility function
that combines both income (or consumption) and leisure time into a
composite measure of well-being. The major alternative is to convert465 The Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being
leisure time into money by using the market wage. While the utility-
function approach is obviously conceptually superior, it faces one (in-
surmountable?) problem: who knows what the right utility function is?
The Distribution of Leisure and Income
What of the distribution of leisure time? Morgan and Smith (1969),
using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, found a slight
negative correlation between leisure and income, but a slight positive
correlation between leisure and the ratio of income to "needs." Siragel-
din (1969) constructed a distribution of economic well-being based on
leisure and the ratio of income to "needs" for data from the Productive
Americans Survey. He found that well-being so defined was distributed
more equally than income. Taussig (1973) valued leisure at the wage,
using data from the Survey of Economic Opportunity, and obtained very
similar results. "Full income" was slightly more equally distributed than
money income. Browning (1976) and Browning and Johnson (forth-
coming) made two different adjustments for nonworking time and found
very substantial equalizing effects.
The conclusions seem to be, therefore, that (a) leisure is distributed
somewhat more equally than income; (b) leisure has a slight negative
correlation with income; and (c) more comprehensive measures of eco-
nomic well-being that include both leisure and income are distributed
more equally than income alone.
Involuntary "Leisure"
Having said this, we must not ignore the fact that not all "leisure"
time is taken voluntarily. A person who is disabled or involuntarily un-
employed does not want to "buy" all the leisure he gets at the going
wage rate. For him, the wage clearly overestimates the marginal value
of leisure time. While there is no satisfactory way at present to decom-
pose unemployment time into "voluntary" and "involuntary" compo-
nents,
8
6 it is at least worth pointing out that the incidence of total un-
employment is highly uneven. The young, the black, and the female
suffer most from unemployment. Involuntary leisure seems concentrated
at the lower end of the income distribution. It is hard (for me at least)
to imagine that this pattern is entirely the result of free choice.
6.6.2 Wealth
In purchasing the goods and services from which they derive satisfac-
tion, people are not restricted to their current income if they have ac-
cumulated wealth on which they can draw. So, if our real concern is with
the distribution of economic well-being, data on the distribution of
wealth are a valuable supplement to data on the distribution of income.
8
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Sources of Data
We know far less about the distribution of wealth in the United States
than about the distribution of income. Certainly nothing comparable to
the annual CPS exists for wealth. What meager knowledge of the wealth
distribution we have comes from three sources.
First, there have been a few surveys of wealth holding, of which the
Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers (SFCC) for 1962
(Projector and Weiss 1966) is undoubtedly the best. But these surveys
have been sporadic, scattered through time, and noncomparable; so they
tell us little about trends in wealth inequality. In addition, it is appar-
ently very hard to elicit accurate data on wealth holding from survey
respondents: even the assiduously planned and executed SFCC was
plagued by underreporting (Projector and Weiss, 1966, pp. 61-62;
Lebergott 1976, pp. 217-223). Nonetheless, the SFCC data on the
wealth distribution in 1962 is undoubtedly the best "snapshot" informa-
tion we have.
Second, estimates of the wealth distribution have been made by the
estate multiplier method. Briefly, this method involves treating individ-
uals who die in a particular year as a random sample (perhaps after
some adjustments) of those who were living in that year. Then estate
tax records on the wealth of decedents can be used to infer the distribu-
tion of wealth among the living.
8
8 However, since only estates above a
certain amount (which for many years was $60,000) are required to file
tax returns, the estate multiplier method can yield information only
about the extreme upper tail of the wealth distribution.
Finally, a clever investigator can piece together scraps of information
from which he can create an estimate of the distribution of wealth
(Lebergott 1976). While this technique may be promising, it involves
considerable judgment and perhaps some guesswork in piecing together
disparate pieces of information, making time series comparisons very
difficult.
The Stylized Facts
The stylized facts of the wealth distribution in the postwar United
States are allegedly as follows: (1) Inequality in the wealth distribution
far exceeds that in the income distribution. (2) There is no noticeable
trend in wealth inequality.
Qualitatively, fact (1) rests on a fairly secure base; but we remain
uncertain of its quantitative dimensions owing to the paucity of data.
The SFCC found the Gini coefficient for wealth to be .76, as compared
to a Gini ratio for income in the same population of .43 (Projector and
Weiss 1966, p. 30). Lansing and Sonquist (1969, p. 50) reported Gini
ratios for wealth within age cohorts in the 1953 and 1962 Surveys of
Consumer Finances ranging from .62 to .69.
8
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ever, has pointed out that these wealth data exclude an important source
of wealth which is both very large in the aggregate and very equally
distributed: the discounted present value of future social security bene-
fits. When he added estimates of this "social security wealth" to the
fungible wealth of those consumer units in the SFCC with heads between
thirty-five and sixty-four years of age, the Gini ratio dropped from .72
to .51. The top 1 percent of wealth holders held 28.4 percent of fungible
wealth, but only 18.9 percent of total wealth. This adjustment, as dra-
matic as it is, does not overturn the conclusion that wealth is more
unequally distributed than income.
George Stigler (1973) once asked in another context, "Is this fact in
fact a fact?" Our second "fact" may not be. What we know from estate
multiplier estimates by Lampman (1962) and Smith and Franklin (1974)
is that the share of the very, very wealthy fell somewhat between the
1920s and the 1940s and has been relatively constant since then. Thus
the alleged stability of the wealth distribution is based on the experience
of the top 0.5 percent (or at best the top 1 percent). It hardly needs to
be stated that the lower 99.5 percent might have had a different experi-
ence. Furthermore, Feldstein (1976) has pointed out that the explosive
growth of (very equally distributed) social security wealth doubtless
imparted some equalizing trend to the wealth distribution.
Combining Wealth and Income
This look at the wealth distribution was motivated by a need to sup-
plement information on income inequality. For this purpose, however,
we need to know the joint distribution of income and wealth across
individuals. Only survey data can give us this information. The SFCC
data show a strong positive correlation between income and wealth
(Projector and Weiss 1966, pp. 6-7), which can hardly be considered
surprising.
The most natural way to combine the distributions of wealth (a stock)
and income (a flow) is to add the annuity value of net worth to census
money income, and then subtract current property income to avoid
double-counting. Weisbrod and Hansen (1968) did approximately this
in combining the SFCC with the 1962 CPS, but were forced to merge
the two data sources in a very crude way. They found that the Gini ratio
of .37 for census income became .42 when the annuity value of net
worth was added at a 4 percent interest rate and .47 when a 10 percent
interest rate was used. Taussig (1973) combined income and net worth
information from the same data source, using a 6 percent interest rate,
and found that the Gini ratio was almost unchanged unless substantial
corrections were made for underreporting of net worth. After those cor-
rections, the Gini ratio rose from .361 to .393. Taking account of the
distribution of wealth thus seems to increase the degree of inequality.468 Alan S. Blinder/Irving Kristol/Wilbur J. Cohen
6.6.3 Living Apart from Relatives (and Nonrelatives)
Whatever benefits the extended family may have brought to its mem-
bers, they came at a cost of increasing household congestion and loss of
privacy. And, apparently, Americans in the postwar period prized the
reduced congestion and increased privacy more than the benefits of the
extended family. Data on the rapid growth of the number of unrelated
individuals—especially young and old people living alone—were cited
earlier in this chapter (see page 437). Table 6.22 offers further data
on this subject.
The Census Bureau defines a subfamily as either a married couple
(with or without children) or a single parent with one or more unmar-
ried children, living in the same household as another family to which
they are related. The number of subfamilies so defined thus seems a
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Sources: Historical Statistics, p. 41, Series A288-A319; Current Population Re-
ports, Series P-20, no. 313, table 5.
iDefined by the Census Bureau as "a married couple with or without children, or
one parent with one or more unmarried children under 18 years old, living in a
household and related to, but not including, the head of the household or his wife."
2Defined by the Census Bureau as "two or more persons such as guests, lodgers, or
resident employees and their relatives, living in a household and related to each
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good indicator of the number of extended families, though single grand-
parents would not be counted as subfamilies. Part A of table 6.22 shows
that the absolute number of subfamilies fell by almost two-thirds be-
tween 1947 and 1977.
9
0 In 1947 almost 9 percent of primary families
had another related family living with them. By 1977 this fraction was
down to barely over 2 percent. Furthermore, almost three-quarters of
these subfamilies in 1947 included both parents, whereas by 1977 less
than half of all subfamilies had two parents. Data in Part B of table
6.22 on the number and frequency of married couples living in the
household of some other family (not necessarily a related family) tell a
similar story.
A phenomenon related to living apart from relatives is the decline in
the number of boarders and lodgers in American households—living
apart from nonrelatives. According to data put together by Lebergott
(1976), the percentage of urban households with a boarder or lodger
decreased from 23 percent in 1900 to 14 percent in 1941 and to only
2 percent in 1970. The lodger, in other words, almost disappeared from
the scene during the postwar period.
Data germane to this phenomenon appear in Part C of table 6.22.
The Census defines a "secondary family" as two or more persons re-
lated to one another but not related to the primary family. This category
includes guests, lodgers, or resident employees; but since single individ-
uals are not counted as secondary families, most lodgers are excluded
in this count. Nonetheless, as many as 2.5 percent of primary families
shared their homes with such an unrelated secondary family in 1947.
Almost none did by 1970.
6.6.4 Health
It will not be considered heretical to assert that, at equal levels of
consumption and leisure, healthier people are better off. And it is quite
clear that the health of the American people has improved considerably
during the postwar period.
Perhaps the most useful summary statistic representing the state of
health is life expectancy. Table 6.23 displays data on life expectancies
at birth and at age twenty. Progress in increasing longevity breaks down
naturally into three distinct periods. Life expectancies increased dra-
matically between 1940 and 1955, but improvement in this regard
slowed for women and virtually ceased for men during the next fifteen
years. However, since 1970 there has been a resurgence in extending
life expectancies, especially for adults. In total, life expectancy of a man
reaching adulthood increased by 8.5 years over the period 1940-77.
For women, the increase was almost 12 years. The reduction in infant
mortality was even more dramatic—infant mortality in 1970 was less
than half what it was in 1940.
9
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Table 6.23 Changes in Life Expectancy, 1940-77
A. Life Expectancy at Birth (in Years) B. Life Expectancy at Age 20
(in Years)
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Source: For 1940-45, Historical Statistics, ser. B108-9, Bl 18-19, pp. 55-56; for
1970, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Public Health Service,
Vital Statistics of the United States, vol. 11, sec. 5, table 5-4 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976); for 1977, U.S. Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, Monthly Vital Statistics Report, Advance Report: Final
Mortality Statistics, 1977. Publication no. (PHS) 79-1120, vol. 28, no. 1, suppl.
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 11 May 1979).
Note: Life expectancy is defined as expected years of life remaining.
aExcludes deaths of nonresidents of the United States.
bWhites only.
Mortality and morbidity from many, but not all, serious diseases has
also fallen dramatically in the postwar period, as table 6.24 shows.
6.6.5 Social Indicators
Not all indicators of well-being are pointing upward. As table 6.25
shows, the postwar period has witnessed a stunning increase in the inci-
dence of illegitimate children, a surge in the divorce rate, and little or no
Table 6.24 Selected Data on Illness and Disease, 1940-70
A. Deaths per 100,000 Population from Selected Diseases
Influenza Cardiovascular
Tuber- and Malignant and








































Source: Historical Statistics, Series B149-166; B291-304, pp. 58 and 77.































1 Illegitimate live births per 1,000 married females. Data from: Historical Statistics,
Series B29, p. 52.
2Divorces per 1,000 married females 15 years old and over. Data from: Historical
Statistics, Series B217, p. 64.
3Suicides per 100,000 population. Data from: Historical Statistics, Series B166,
p. 58.
4Crimes known to police per 1,000,000 population. Two series are spliced here. The
right-hand series pertains to the entire United States, and the number reported for
1955 is actually for 1957. The left-hand series pertains to urban areas only and is
constructed by the author from separate data on urban crimes and urban popula-
tion. (Urban population for 1955 is interpolated between the 1950 and 1960
censuses.) Data from: Historical Statistics, Series H952; Series H962, p. 413; Se-
ries A57, p. 11.
progress against suicide. Furthermore, crime has been one of our biggest
growth industries. There is little cause for cheer in any of this.
6.6.6 Happiness
"Early to bed, early to rise, makes a man healthy, wealthy, and wise."
This rhyme, I suppose, is meant to be a formula for happiness. Amer-
icans, we have seen, are indeed considerably wealthier and healthier




This is not the sort of question an economist feels comfortable with
—and with good reason. Nonetheless, a provocative paper by Easterlin
(1974) attempted to answer this question by studying opinion poll data
on people's self-proclaimed happiness. Easterlin's findings for the United
States are easily summarized. At a given point in time, happiness seems
clearly to increase with economic status. However, as we look over time,
there is little if any upward trend in happiness despite noticeable im-
provements in the average standard of living.
These findings suggest one of two things. Either "happiness" is a
relative concept which depends (only) on each person's situation rela-
tive to that of his peers, or that, regardless of how happy people really
are in an absolute sense, they tend to answer a survey question like this
by rating their happiness relative to that of their contemporaries. There
is probably no operational way of distinguishing between these two
competing hypotheses, though they are different. For example, if we
compare a family with income of $18,264 in 1977 and one with $3,546
in 1947 (the means for the two years), the first hypothesis states that472 Alan S. Blinder/Irving Kristol/Wilbur J. Cohen
they are equally happy while the second hypothesis states that the 1977
family is happier on an absolute scale, but no more happy on a relative
scale—and responds to the questioner by reporting on relative happi-
ness. I personally find the latter interpretation more appealing.
6.7 In Conclusion
When / use a word ... it means just what I choose it to mean—
neither more nor less.
Lewis Carroll
We have seen in this essay that, according to the official data, average
incomes generally have been rising during the postwar period while in-
come inequality has been relatively constant. Can we accept these "facts"
at face value? What welfare implications, if any, follow from them?
6.7.1 Income Levels and Economic Well-Being
The data show that per capita income and consumption increased
roughly 80 percent in real terms between 1947 and 1977. In addition
to consuming more of most goods and services, Americans changed their
patterns of consumption markedly. For the most part, these redirections
of spending seem recognizable as improvements in the quality of life.
In addition, longevity and health improved, leisure time expanded, and
privacy increased. Yet over the same period a number of social indi-
cators such as divorce, illegitimacy, and crime signal a deterioration in
the quality of life, and people report themselves no happier than thirty
years ago. What are we to make of all this? Must we abandon the use
of income as a measure of well-being?
My own impression is that we need not. For one thing, our main use
of income as a gauge of well-being is cross-sectional, and it still seems
reasonable to view people with higher incomes as "better off" at any
moment in time—despite some anomalies. Second, even looking across
time, my guess is that rising average income does indeed improve the
human lot—though perhaps not by as much as the data suggest. Various
nonincome aspects of well-being, such as leisure time and health, may
not grow as rapidly as material consumption; growth may produce a
variety of well-known disamenities (e.g., pollution and congestion); and
we should not entirely ignore the message that "happiness" is perhaps a
relativistic concept. While it would be presumptuous to conclude that
people are 80 percent "better off" now than they were in 1947, it seems
preposterous to conclude that they are no better off.
6.7.2 Income Inequality and Economic Well-Being
Things get quite a bit murkier when we turn our attention to the trend
(or lack thereof) in income inequality. During the postwar period, a473 The Level and Distribution of Economic Weil-Being




1. A shifting age distribution that left the 1977 economy with rela-
tively more old and young (and thus lower paid) members than
the 1947 economy.
2. An increasing incidence of female headship of families.
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3. Changes in living arrangements that produced more low-income
units as extended families broke up, fewer families took in lodgers
and boarders, and more young and old people formed their own
households.
In brief, when we look at the United States economy from 1947 to
1977, we are not looking at a society unchanging in composition by age,
sex, and family structure. And most of the demographic changes that
occurred were the sort that produce greater inequality, given our mea-
surement procedures. Two conclusions follow. First, if we could measure
the income distribution at fixed demography, a trend toward equality
would emerge—a trend that the official data mask. Second, most of the
factors that served to increase inequality during the postwar period do
not signify deteriorations in economic well-being. Indeed, the opposite
seems more likely. Measured income inequality thus seems an unreliable
indicator of economic welfare.
Despite these and other disequalizing factors, the overall income dis-
tribution—as measured—did not become more unequal. The main rea-
sons seem to have been a variety of government redistributive activities,
including:
1. The rapid growth of cash transfers which, we have seen, have been
the principal weapon in the War on Poverty.
2. The equally rapid growth of transfers in kind, which are not in-
cluded in the official data (another reason why the official data
understate the trend toward equality).
3. Other programs such as affirmative action guidelines, equal oppor-
tunity and antidiscrimination laws. These programs have not been
dealt with in this chapter because we lack estimates of their effects
on income inequality.
9
5 But I would be remiss not to suggest a
possible link between these governmental activities and the ob-
served narrowing of black-white income differentials.
It appears that, on balance, these competing sets of factors—demog-
raphy versus government—battled to a standoff. Income inequality, as
measured in the official data, was unchanged between 1947 and 1977.
But I would not want to push the analogy to a tug-of-war too far, be-
cause there is reason to suspect that the two sides were not independent.
Specifically, government programs designed to equalize posttax post-
transfer incomes may well have helped disequalize pretax pretransfer
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It has often been suggested that redistributive tax and transfer
schemes have disincentive effects that, e.g., discourage labor supply
among beneficiaries (such as the poor or the elderly).
9
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It is conceivable, though here we know much less, that transfer pro-
grams such as AFDC and social security may have contributed to some
of the changes in family structure and living arrangements that were
just labeled as disequalizing factors (e.g., increases in female headship,
more elderly people living alone).
It is quite possible that expenditures on public education (an appar-
ently "equalizing" transfer in kind) were among the factors leading to
the more pronounced age-income profile—thus contributing to a grow-
ing gap between annual and lifetime inequality.
No wonder, then, that in the wonderland of inequality,
it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you
want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!
Lewis Carroll
Notes
1. For a detailed treatment of postwar demographic changes, see Easterlin,
chapter 4 of this volume.
2. For an extensive discussion of opportunity sets, see Gordon (1977).
3. Conversely, two people with equal incomes may have gotten there from very
different opportunity sets.
4. Even the CPS data are not perfectly consistent over time. Minor changes in
such factors as definitions and survey techniques have been made. For a more
detailed discussion and critique of the census-income concept, see Taussig (1977).
5. On this, see Lebergott (1976, pp. 11-12) or Rivlin (1975).
6. For more detailed technical discussions of this issue, the interested reader is
referred to Atkinson (1970), Sen (1973), or Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973).
7. Readers familiar with the Gini ratio may skip the rest of this section, which
is a nontechnical explanation for lay readers.
8. By the formula for the area of a triangle, this area is always one-half.
9. But not all, as a well-known paper by Budd (1970) established.
10. A full account of these recessions can be found in the paper by Robert
Gordon, chapter 2 of this volume.
11. Defined specifically as personal income plus retained earnings plus contribu-
tions for social insurance (both employee's and employer's shares).
12. Defined specifically as disposable income (as in the NIA) plus retained
earnings, or alternatively as augmented personal income minus contributions for
social insurance minus personal tax and nontax payments.
13. All deflation is done using the implicit deflator for personal consumption
expenditures.
14. It hardly needs pointing out that the national income accounts measure
nominal interest, not real interest. The share of interest has risen mainly because
there is trend in the inflation rate.475 The Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being
15. Age of the housing stock refers to private nonfarm residential structures
containing from one to four units. The increase in the incidence of running water
and flush toilets came largely in rural areas.
16. Absolute prices rose only 15 percent over thirty years, which implies that
relative prices fell 57 percent.
17. In 1940, there were 2,412,000 private household workers and 34,949,000
households. By 1970, the number of private household workers had fallen slightly
to 2,347,000, while the number of households had risen to 63,401,000, according
to Historical Statistics, Series D-567 and A-288.
18. A procedure the Commerce Department does not follow. I have taken sev-
eral liberties with their way of organizing the data.
19. This category also includes radios, musical instruments, and records.
20. For detailed discussions of this topic, see Taussig (1977) and Danziger
(1977).
21. The income concept underlying this table differs from census income, and
so these distributions are not directly comparable to those in table 6.9.
22. Table 6.11 pertains to families, and excludes unrelated individuals.
23. A similar calculation comparing the richest tenth and 4he poorest tenth
brings an apparent 15:1 ratio in the raw data down to only 2.8:1.
24. This issue has been stressed by Kuznets (1974), among others.
25. My discussion of this point is deliberately sketchy. For further details, see
Richard Easterlin's chapter 4 of this volume.
26. Blinder and Esaki (1978) report detecting a statistically significant break
in the trend for several percentile shares around 1958.
27. A regression was run with the Gini ratio as the dependent variable, and the
following independent variables: the unemployment rate; a constant; a dummy
variable which is 1 starting in 1958; time; and the interaction of time with the
dummy. The coefficient of time was —.0022 (with standard error .0004). The sum
of the coefficients of time and the interaction term, which is the post-1958 time
trend, was —.0004 (with standard error .0017).
28. In a regression identical to that reported in note 27, the estimated time
trend in the Gini ratio among unrelated individuals was —.0014 (standard error
= .0013) until 1957 and —.0040 (standard error .0017) thereafter.
29. Table 6.16 summarizes the whole distribution by the Gini ratio only to keep
the volume of data manageable. Inspection of the underlying distributions reveals,
fortunately, that there are hardly any instances of crossing Lorenz curves—the
circumstance that would render the Gini ratio potentially misleading. The few
Lorenz curve crossings that occur are indicated in footnotes to table 6.16. The
year 1964 was selected for this table because it comes closest to being a "typical"
postwar year.
30. The reader is reminded that, by Census Bureau definitions, there are no
one-person families.
31. I will have more to say on the subject of age and the income distribution
when I discuss the accounting period, since the problems arise largely from mea-
suring income in a particular year rather than over the lifetime.
32. The section is limited to the family income distribution both to save space
and because most of the literature does the same.
33. Let us be clear about what this simple adjustment does not do. If we are
interested in income as an indicator of well-being, as we are, then a proper "ad-
justment" for taxes and transfers really requires resolution of every complex and
controversial issue in tax incidence theory. What portion of the value of any
transfer payment actually accrues to the recipient? What part of the burden of a476 Alan S. Blinder/Irving Kristol/Wilbur J. Cohen
sales tax falls on the consumer of the product? Can the income tax be shifted?
It hardly needs saying that questions such as these are well beyond the scope of
this chapter and indeed probably also beyond the scope of current economic
knowledge. My aim here is much more modest: to get the bookkeeping straight.
Specifically, subtraction of individual income tax payments and the employee's
share of the payroll tax from census income (the employer's share is already
excluded), is not meant to imply that the burden of these taxes falls entirely on
those who pay them. Nor does the absence of any deduction for indirect taxes
imply that they are totally borne by firms.
34. An exception is Smeeding (1979a), who also deducts indirect taxes.
35. This table is drawn from a detailed study of the 1972 distribution using
micro data and the old Office of Business Economics (OBE) income concept. The
findings correspond closely to those reported earlier by Budd (1967) for 1962.
Table 6.17 shows much less redistribution than that implied by the data in Brown-
ing (1976).
36. On sales and excise taxes, see Smeeding (1979a). Sales taxes are usually
viewed as regressive, but Browning (1978) argues that they should be considered
as progressive. Smeeding (1979c) disagrees.
37. Browning (1976) reaches a similar conclusion.
38. According to Browning (1976), transfers in kind (including public educa-
tion) increased from 7.2 percent of census income in 1952 to 9 percent in 1962
and 14.6 percent in 1972.
39. For further discussion, see Smolensky et al. (1977).
40. Their justification, I presume, is either on some externality argument or on
grounds of paternalism.
41. Smolensky et al. (1977) did not try to price out public education by this
method, which is difficult because the market for private education is so thin and
because public and private education seem to be different products.
42. The volume and distribution of educational transfers are apparently not in
dispute.
43. See Smeeding (1979a, p. 941).
44. Lorenz curves for income before and after cash transfers do not cross, so
the Gini ratio is probably a satisfactory summary statistic. Studies alluded to in-
clude Danziger and Plotnick (1977), Taussig (1973), Smolensky et al. (1977),
and Garfinkel and Haveman (1978), and cover years ranging from 1965 to 1974.
45. According to Browning and Johnson (forthcoming, table 1), in 1976 the
lowest fifth of families (ranked by total income) received 63 percent of its income
in the form of transfers.
46. Smeeding (1979a) attempted an adjustment for employer pension contribu-
tions but, as Browning (1979) pointed out, was guilty of double-counting since
census income includes income from pensions. In principle, we might want to
include either pension contributions when made or pension income when received,
but not both.
47. His distribution assigned 68 percent of the gains to the top fifth and 3 per-
cent to the bottom fifth.
48. Real capital gains as a percentage of disposable income varied from +38
percent in 1958 to —54 percent in 1946. A regression of this ratio against time
produced a coefficient that was essentially zero.
49. A similar analysis can be found in Danziger (1977).
50. For the "typical" 3-5 percent reduction, see Benus and Morgan's (1975)
calculations for a 1968-72 Office of Economic Opportunity panel and for a special477 The Level and Distribution of Economic Weil-Being
panel designed to study the impact of the 1964 income tax cuts; and Kohen,
Parnes, and Shea's (1975) results with the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS)
of mature men. Earlier, Vandome (1958) had reported similar results for the
United Kingdom.
51. Benus and Morgan (1975) reported a 9 percent reduction in the Gini coeffi-
cient in a 1967-70 panel study of purchases of durable goods, and Kohen, Parnes,
and Shea (1975) found a 10 percent reduction among the NLS young men.
52. Hoffman and Podder (1976) report declines in several measures of inequal-
ity ranging from 13 percent to 21 percent when the accounting period is length-
ened from one year to seven years. David and Menchik (1979) find an even
stronger effect: the coefficient of variation declines 14 percent when income over
three years is used instead of annual income.
53. The coefficient of variation, a common measure of dispersion, is the ratio of
the standard deviation to the mean.
54. Soltow's (1965) study of the distributional history of the town of Sarps-
borg, Norway from 1928 to 1960 found that the thirty-three-year Gini ratio was
27 percent lower than the average of the one-year Gini ratios. Blomquist (1976)
estimated that the Gini ratio for lifetime income among employed males in Swe-
den was about half as large as the Gini ratio for annual income.
55. This classification follows Danziger, Haveman, and Smolensky (1977).
56. The data are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Technical Report no. 17,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), and are not reproduced here.
57. Figure 6.3 shows smooth curves fitted (by eye) to grouped data. Each mean
income is expressed as a fraction of the income of families headed by a 45-54
year old.
58. For criticisms of Paglin's method, see Danziger, Haveman, and Smolensky
(1977) and Minarik (1977).
59. The third part arises from the fact that the upper part of the low-income
groups have higher incomes than the lower parts of the high-income groups. For
a lucid explanation of Pyatt's decomposition and a discussion of how it relates to
Paglin's technique, see Murray (1978).
60. For further discussion see Shorrocks (1978) or Blinder (1976).
61. For a fuller discussion, see Weinstein and Smolensky (1976).
62. Kilpatrick (1973) used Gallup poll surveys of minimal income needs to
argue that the man on the street's concept of the poverty line rises with average
income, though less than in strict proportion. Lebergott (1976, pp. 53-60) col-
lected data showing that payments to poor on relief remained about 30 percent of
the wage for common labor for more than a century. See also Rainwater (1974,
esp. chaps. 3 and 5).
63. Based on the work of Orshansky (1965).
64. Lebergott (1976, pp. 70-76) has objected eloquently to the "scientific"
budgets that underlie the minimum decency standard.
65. This is no trivial problem. The CPS each year finds a number of families
with negative income (and census income excludes capital losses). For example,
in 1977 the mean income among the 2 percent of families with incomes below
$2,000 was —$1,700. One wonders how many families with negative income are
"poor" in any meaningful sense.
66. U.S. Bureau of the Census Current Population Reports, Series P-60, no. 119.
67. Non-whites constituted 34 percent of all poor persons; among heads of poor
families, 63 percent had not finished high school; the average family size was 3.67.
See Current Population Reports, Series P-60, no. 119.478 Alan S. Blinder/Irving Kristol/Wilbur J. Cohen
68. The poor are those below 44 percent of the median income.
69. These fluctuations may be due to inconsistencies in estimation methods over
time. See Plotnick and Smeeding (1979, fn. 16).
70. For data on black-white earnings differentials, see Richard Freeman, chap-
ter 5 of this volume.
71. The data pertain to "nonwhites," rather than to blacks. However, blacks
predominate in this group.
72. Versus 9 percent and 11 percent for white families in the two years. Data
are from Danziger and Lampman (1978).
73. The same ratio for men was also .56 in 1955, but improved only to .69 in
1977. See Thurow (1979).
74. Freeman addresses this issue in chapter 5 of this volume.
75. And the same wealth. More on wealth later.
76. The crucial words in these last two sentences, of course, are "voluntarily"
and "voluntary." Not all interpersonal differences in hours of work are voluntary.
More on this below.
77. Or there can be more leisure time on the job. On this, see Stafford and
Duncan (1977).
78. Historical Statistics. The work week comes from series D-765, p. 168; the
work day is reported as 9.89 hours in Series D-847, p. 172.
79. The older and newer hours series are not entirely comparable, though both
display downward trends. The data series cited in my note 78 ends in 1926, when
average weekly hours are 50.3. The newer series used for postwar comparisons
records a value of 45 for that same year.
80. Gordon and Blinder (forthcoming) explore reasons for this phenomenon.
81. Reirners (1976) shows that these data need not imply that the mean age of
retirement among those who actually retire has decreased; and she estimates that
it has been fairly constant at around 65 years of age. The reason is that there are
fewer and fewer people who never retire.
82. Real consumption per capita rose about 80 percent. The percentage increase
in leisure is the percentage decrease in working time multiplied by the initial ratio
of work to leisure. If that initial ratio was two, for example, then leisure time
rose 32 percent.
83. But it is not clear that it is. Most of the work-saving machinery that has
helped the housewife became widespread only after World War II.
84. It should be noted, however, that housewives were more overworked in
1900 than were paid workers. Housewives, it seems, really did work the proverbial
six or seven twelve-hour days.
85. Yet one more qualification. Women are spending far more time in the paid
work force than they used to. So the reduction in housework often may not repre-
sent more leisure time.
86. Taussig (1973) makes an attempt at this. Browning (1976) and Browning
and Johnson (forthcoming) treat all nonworking time as voluntary leisure.
87. Were the lifetime used as the interval for measuring income, there would
be little need for separate data on wealth. The present value of income would
differ from (human plus nonhuman) wealth only to the extent that inheritances
differ (in present value) from bequests.
88. For a discussion of the method, and examples of its use, see Lampman
(1962) or Smith (1974).
89. Since Gini coefficients within these age cohorts were .70^.71 in the SFCC,
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90. The year 1940 is included also to show the increase in living together
brought about by the war.
91. Twenty deaths per one thousand live births in 1970 versus forty-seven in
1940.
92. I resist the temptation to equate education with wisdom.
93. The word "autonomous" needs some explanation. I do not mean to imply
that these forces were God-given or exogenous in some ultimate sense, but only
that they probably were not themselves effects of the changing income distribution.
94. Among the many factors contributing toward this development were higher
divorce rates, more illegitimate births, and changing social mores regarding the
role of women. For a full discussion, see Ross and Sawhill (1975).
95. They are dealt with by Richard Freeman in chapter 5 of this volume.
96. A possible counterweight to this is that withdrawal of labor supply may
push up the relative wages of these groups.
2. Irving Kristol
Some Personal Reflections on Economic Weil-Being
and Income Distribution
It is my understanding, from surveying various studies of trends in in-
come distribution in the United States over the past three decades, that
economists have found very little significant change to have taken place.
There does seem to have been a slight increase in the proportion of
national income received by the very poor, a slight decrease in the pro-
portion received by the very rich. What goes on in between is such a
complex muddle that economic analysis can tease few unquestionable
inferences from the data. Moreover, the very methodology of studying
income distribution has, over these decades, become ever more contro-
versial. Just what is to be included in the concept of "income" becomes
less clear every time a new governmental "entitlement" program is
launched (whether it involves food, housing, medicine, or whatever).
And it has become ever more apparent that in order to take account of
normal age differentials in earnings, of changing demographies, and of
economic mobility (both up and down), the distribution of "lifetime
earnings" would give us a far more valid report than any cross-sectional
survey at a moment in time. The trouble is that economists have not
come up with any accepted procedure for measuring any such distribu-
tion of lifetime earnings, and there are even some grounds for thinking
they never will.
Does it matter? What, precisely, is the point of all of these studies
and of the interminable controversies they generate?
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When one raises this issue among economists, one discovers that they
tend to feel that, in some way or other, income inequalities ought to
have a significant relation to other larger issues such as the rate of eco-
nomic growth, economic stability or instability, social and historical
stability or instability, or even that sense of well-being we vaguely call
"happiness" or "contentment." And yet it is astonishing how little by
way of any such relationships economic and social research have come
up with. Increases and decreases in income inequalities, as convention-
ally measured, appear to be indifferently compatible with social turbu-
lence as with social stability, with economic decline as with economic
growth, with political order as with political chaos, with an increase in
individual and social pathologies (e.g., suicide, alcoholism, drug addic-
tion, crime) as with a decrease. Inequality, one gets the impression, is
an important issue for today's social scientists despite the fact that such
importance escapes all empirical verification.
To complicate matters even further, any effort to relate income in-
equality even to strictly economic well-being is plagued by the fact that
the concept of economic well-being is itself not so unambiguous as some
economists believe. An improvement in economic well-being can be
quite rigorously defined as an increase in (actual or potential) purchas-
ing power over the material goods of this world (i.e., the goods that
money can buy). But this brute statistical fact is always "processed"
through people's minds, and it is the ideas and attitudes in these minds
that ultimately determine the meaning we give to any brute statistical
fact. Fortunately for the science of economics, those ideas and attitudes
are not utterly disparate, incoherent, and inconstant. One can therefore
say, with some confidence, that most people, most of the time, and most
anywhere, wish to see their purchasing power increase and are pleased
when that occurs. Having said that, however, one must also go on to say
that particular circumstances can modify or even overwhelm any purely
statistical measure of economic well-being. Both poverty and affluence
can have ambiguities that escape the strictly economic perspective.
It is an observable fact that not all people who are statistically poor
are everywhere equally miserable or have an equal sense of being "badly
off." The past and the future always shape our sense of the present. So
much, therefore, depends on the hopes one may have for one's children,
the faith one may have in the ultimate benignity and "fairness" of Provi-
dence, on the assurance and solace one may derive from traditions.
Poverty does not always dehumanize, and relative affluence can have its
costs in human terms—costs that are actually, if often dimly, felt. Any-
one who has seen Fiddler on the Roof and contrasted the lives portrayed
there with the lives of Jews in Long Island's Great Neck today, will
appreciate the immense difficulties involved in disentangling economic
well-being from other kinds of well-being.481 The Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being
Similarly, on the street where I lived until recently there was a Chi-
nese family, recent immigrants, who ran a basement laundry. The parents
and their five children shared the two tiny rooms at the back of the tiny
store, and I shudder to think what this family did to our official poverty
statistics. Still, those parents expressed great confidence that their chil-
dren would "get ahead"—and, in fact, all five ended up as college grad-
uates. Ought not one to incorporate that prospect in any estimate of the
family's economic well-being? In contrast, on that same street there
were several welfare families whose incomes, in cash and kind and ser-
vices, may well have been larger than that of our Chinese family, but
who were in various stages of a dependency-induced corruption, with
little family stability and with the children involved in drugs and delin-
quency. Would an increase in their welfare receipts really have improved
their economic well-being? If it had merely accelerated their demoraliza-
tion, how would that relate to economic well-being?
Or, at the other extreme, take the case of a statistically affluent sub-
urban child who has every advantage, as we say, but who comes to
experience those advantages as bars in a "gilded cage," to use Max
Weber's prescient phrase. He perceives the improbability of his surpass-
ing his successful father in either economic or professional terms. He
finds family and community life empty of meaning, and school a dis-
tracting bore. So he "drops out" of the world he was born into and
becomes a "bohemian," a pseudobohemian, or a drifter, living—perhaps
placidly, perhaps miserably—off handouts and odd jobs. What meaning
are we to ascribe to the statistics of his economic well-being, before and
after? When affluence can demoralize as vigorously as poverty, can we
take the statistics on economic well-being with the solemnity that econ-
omists are naturally inclined to do?
And, of course, this matter becomes infinitely more complicated if we
try somehow to incorporate the idea of economic equality into the idea
of economic well-being, as so many economists think proper. Here,
ordinary people seem to have an intuitive respect for existential com-
plexities that economists often seem to lack. The intensity with which
economists work out their Gini coefficients, and the subtlety with which
they measure income trends in the quintiles or deciles of the population,
is matched—so far as I can see—by the utter lack of interest of the
average American in their findings. To some extent, perhaps, this is be-
cause those findings are never definitive—every piece of research seems
to give rise to an exercise in counterresearch, and the arguments soon
unravel into microdisputations. But mainly, I think, it is because the
average person is far less interested in economic inequality—or is inter-
ested in it in quite a different way—than is the average social scientist.
Why? One reason, I would say, is that the social scientist links the
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average person. It is certainly true that as a society becomes more afflu-
ent, the "poverty line," as popularly perceived, will also move upward.
Today, for example, no one would dispute the fact that the absence of
private, indoor toilet facilities—an absence our grandparents would
have found not at all shocking—is a sure sign of poverty. On the other
hand, the average person feels free to distinguish between "needs" and
"wants" in ways that the average economist, qua economist, is prohib-
ited from doing. People who have what are perceived to be minimally
adequate food, shelter, and clothing may be seen as poor, but not as
problematically poor, regardless of how far down they are in the income
distribution. And if one looks at poverty in this way, then the percentage
of the American people who qualify as poor is small—well under 10
percent. A social scientist might retort that any such "absolute" defini-
tion of poverty is arbitrary, as compared with a definition in terms of
relative income. But it is precisely this question to which economics can
never hope to give an authoritative answer.
This popular perception of poverty is closely linked to a popular
perception of opportunity—specifically, the opportunity to move out of
poverty. To the degree that poverty is not viewed as a necessarily per-
manent condition, it will be of less concern. And the average American
is strongly of the opinion that, leaving the physically handicapped (in
which one would include the elderly) aside, there really is no reason
for anyone in the lowest quintile of the income distribution to interpret
his condition as permanent, since opportunities for "bettering one's con-
dition" will and do exist. It may be recalled that Adam Smith had ear-
lier suggested that the modus operandi of a market economy is such that
economic mobility—and the eventual distribution of income as well—
would of a certainty be less unequal than in any other kind of society.
The reason for this is that the talents requisite for success in such an
economy are so mundane, and the role of sheer luck is so great, that
economic mobility should be greater, and eventual economic inequali-
ties less significant, than in noncapitalist orders. Americans on the whole
tend to accept this thesis as a fact of life. Social scientists, in contrast,
think it important either to prove or disprove this thesis by research.
I carefully say "social scientists" because sociologists are perhaps
even more prominent in this endeavor than economists. It is they who
have created a sizable library of ever more technical literature on the
question of "social mobility," of which income mobility is the major
component. It is an open question whether this literature provides more
enlightenment than obfuscation. We do know, without benefit of re-
search, that if economic growth tends to create new and better-paying
jobs and occupations and professions (as it does), then the statistics
will obviously reveal considerable upward social and economic mobility
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whether everyone benefits equally from these changes, and they do seem
to be especially concerned as to whether those who are already in the top
decile manage to hang in there. The statistical procedures of sociologists
are such that one begins with a rigorously egalitarian definition of social
mobility, one in which the children of upper-class parents are down-
wardly mobile, while their places are taken by the upwardly mobile—a
world turned upside-down indeed!—and then measure the actuality in
the light of this "ideal." The fact that there has never been such a so-
ciety, or that the very idea of such a society is inherently absurd, some-
how is lost,sight of.
It is sociologists, too, who have popularized the concept of "relative
deprivation," which is supposed to explain why people's views of their
own economic well-being are inextricably intertwined with the idea of
equality. Now, there certainly is such a thing as a sense of relative depri-
vation, but it turns out to have only a limited connection with the larger
idea of equality and to be more intimately related to the idea of justice
or fairness ("to each his due"). Thus, there have been innumerable
strikes in the United States over pay differentials among workers ("equal
pay for equal work!"), yet I do not recall a case of there being a strike
over the chief executive officer's very high salary. If sociologists tacitly
assume—as practically all seem to do—that a more egalitarian society
is (and will be perceived to be) a more just society, that is an assump-
tion which derives from ideology, not from history or contemporary
experience.
And much the same is true, I would say, for the way in which—and
the intensity with which—economists study income inequalities. One
begins blandly with the premise that absolute equality is the ideal state
and then one measures degrees of departure from this ideal. Yes, I know,
there is nothing "normative" about such a statistical procedure—it is
merely a mathematical convenience that zero inequality is taken as the
base for all measurements. But is it not odd that it is impossible to point
to a study that breathes satisfaction (as distinct from Schadenfreude)
at discovering an increase in economic inequality? This whole literature
is as profoundly suffused with ideology as it is liberally bespattered with
statistics.
What, really, is the point of this keen interest among economists and
sociologists in the issue of inequality? There is precious little evidence
to the effect that it responds to a widespread popular concern and much
evidence to the contrary. Indeed, one gets the distinct impression that
much of the research is directed toward "raising the consciousness" of
the public about the issue—and that the rest of the research is directed
toward rebutting such "consciousness raising" efforts. It is hard to be-
lieve that even the most casual reader can fail to perceive the essentially
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My own view—admittedly a bit extreme—is that when you need an
economist or a sociologist to bring you intelligence about inequalities
of income or social class, that is in itself proof that neither issue is of
serious concern to the citizenry. There are simply no "mysteries" to be
elucidated about income inequality and social class, since there is no
reason to think that common opinion, based on observation and experi-
ence and gossip, is likely to be self-deceiving about a matter of such
interest to everyone. The very notion that such self-deception is probable
derives from the Marxist idea—an ideological conception of the role of
ideology—that bourgeois society is constantly at work instilling "false
consciousness" into the populace.
At this point a social scientist might object that opinion poll data do
reveal that people misconstrue the social and economic reality they in-
habit—that, for instance, households with incomes of $100,000 a year
blandly report themselves to be "middle class." To this objection, there
are two rejoinders.
First, if a $100,000-a-year household thinks itself to be middle class,
then it is middle class. And the same is true for a $10,000-a-year house-
hold. What on earth gives social scientists the authority to dismiss such
"subjective" conceptions of class and to impose a presumably more
"objective" one? Here again we are dealing with a Marxist derivative
that has been unthinkingly adopted by modern social science. Class may
(or may not) find phenomenological expression, but at root it is a mode
of self-definition. There are aristocrats in England who are as poor as
church mice but are definitely "upper class." And there are immigrants
to the United States who are also as poor as church mice but are defi-
nitely "middle class" from the moment they set foot here. The very
thought that there is someone ("up there?") who knows better than we
do what class we are in is as breathtaking in its intellectual presumption
as it is sterile for all serious purposes of social research.
Second, when poll data reveal vast, apparent misconceptions about
other people—about how rich or poor they are, or how powerful or
weak they are—such data ought not to be taken too seriously. No eco-
nomic, social, or political system could function for a moment if people
actually had wildly unrealistic notions of their economic, social, and
political reality. The interesting question here for social research is why
people express such opinions and beliefs to pollsters, not why they have
them.
My own explanation for the keen interest of social scientists in the
nonobvious issue of equality is that this is but one manifestation of how
nineteenth-century ideologies—and most especially the socialist ideology
—have so decisively shaped modern social science. Thus, it is my under-
standing that the National Bureau of Economic Research was itself
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of economic inequality—an issue then posed by socialist, quasi-socialist,
or "progressive" critics who maintained that, under capitalism, the rich
were getting richer while the poor were getting poorer. It was they who
defined the issue—and it is they who have been defining it ever since.
It is fascinating to note the way in which research does not dispose of
this issue. One might have thought, as the evidence accumulated to the
effect that nothing very novel or exciting has happened to the distribu-
tion of income in recent decades—and there is even evidence to suggest
that nothing very exciting has happened in the past century—that social
scientists would simply lose interest in the question. They have not.
Instead the studies become ever more sophisticated, ever more incom-
prehensible to the noninitiated, ever more "scholastic" in the pejorative
sense of that term—and they still don't bring us tidings of significance.
The impulse behind such studies can hardly be designated as routinely
"scientific."
It can, however, be quite easily recognized as "ideological." The
prominence of the issue of equality, I should say, reflects the degree to
which egalitarian, quasi-socialist conceptions of justice have permeated
our culture, including the thinking of many social scientists who do not
regard themselves as in any way socialist but who, as a matter of course,
use the ideal of a socialist society—classless and egalitarian—as a proper
criterion for the judging of capitalist reality. Of all the social sciences,
economics has been the least influenced by this ideological impulse, in
part because the discipline of economics is truly more rigorous than the
other social sciences; in part because a respect for market processes is
indigenous to the methodology of this discipline. But economists are
human, and it could not remain unaffected. One has only to recall the
ingenuity and persistence with which distinguished professors of eco-
nomics elaborated quite fanciful justifications for the progressive income
tax—for which there is no economic, as distinct from moral or political
—justification since it involves an interpersonal comparison of utilities
which is beyond the scope of economics.
It is understandably irksome to many economists that the science of
economics, strictly considered, should not offer answers to many impor-
tant questions that appear to be economic in nature but in fact belong
to moral and political theory. Indeed, we have witnessed recently a
vigorous dissenting movement by advocates of something called "politi-
cal economy"—sometimes "normative economics," sometimes simply
"radical political economy"—who argue in favor of a candid union of
economics with ideology. These are for the most part younger econo-
mists who are discontented with the limits of their social-scientific disci-
pline and who wish to import into economics all of those intellectual
and moral considerations that used to constitute the body of political
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is equality, as an ideal or nonideal for a good society.) One may sym-
pathize with the moral and intellectual passions behind this movement
while realizing they are destructive of the integrity of economics as a
scientific discipline.
What it comes down to, in the end, is the need for economists to
recognize their severe limitations qua economists. Economics has many
useful and important things to tell us, but it really has nothing to say
about the larger features of a good society, or about the status of equal-
ity or inequalities in such a society, and it only has something to say
about "economic well-being" on a fairly narrow—though not unimpor-
tant—definition. Those economic statistics we are being deluged with do
tell us something valid about the real world; but they often tell us less
of the truth about the real world than economists are—by virtue of their
deformation professionelle—inclined to think.
3. Wilbur J. Cohen
Economic Weil-Being and Income Distribution
I have been asked to present my personal reactions to the issues dealing
with income transfer programs as they affected the economic well-being
and income distribution during the postwar period. The basis for my
comments derives from Alan S. Blinder's broad-gauged and informative
essay on this important topic.
I am not quite sure what Martin Feldstein had in mind when he asked
me to do this. I assume he thought that one of the significant develop-
ments of both the post-1929 depression and the post-World War II
economy was the striking growth of transfer payments, public and pri-
vate, and because of my participation in these developments, I should
be prepared to explain and defend my previous actions in this area.
Perhaps it passed through his mind that at this reflective stage of my
life as a Senior Citizen I might admit my role in the expansion of our
income transfer programs was all a mistake, and I would ask forgiveness
for my sins and errors. Or perhaps I might review the postwar develop-
ments in these programs and say enough was enough and let's stop, look,
and listen before going any further. Or I might express some doubts
about the wisdom of some past specific decisions as they affect savings,
investment, and productivity.
But then maybe he assumed I would vigorously defend past policy
decisions and we could have a rousing controversy about such issues as
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compulsion, regressive payroll taxes, the adverse impact on work incen-
tives, and the abuse and fraud involved in the programs.
As you will see, I am not going to do any of these things.
There is some advantage in reaching age sixty-five and reflecting
about one's past activities. It is easy to conclude that we had complete
freedom of choice at each juncture or to conclude that, on the basis of
the choices at the time, we chose the only one we could have selected.
I really can't—or won't—comment on which of these seems to me now
to be the correct one. But I will say that we should be willing to learn
from past experience and revise decisions in the light of new develop-
ments. But I would quickly add the latter isn't always feasible or simple.
Sometimes the good is the enemy of the better. Sometimes it is better
not to substitute unknown and untried proposals for known and current
evils.
I was seventeen years old in 1930 when I entered the University of
Wisconsin. My fellow students were troubled and concerned about the
collapse of the economy and the values in which they and their parents
believed. Although they did not then utilize the term "quality of life,"
they embraced the concept. We read Henry Adams, Lincoln Steffens,
Thorstein Veblen, and Karl Marx, along with Aristotle, Plato, and
Thucydides. We searched for explanations and, of course, permanent
solutions to the vexing problems of the times.
Within a short time I gravitated to the Economics Department, where
the dominating influences were John R. Commons, Selig Perlman, Ed-
win E. Witte, and other faculty members who became identified as
"institutionalists." After several courses it began to dawn on me that
one could improve the quality of life of people by changing, creating, or
restructuring some of the institutions, particularly economic ones. John
R. Commons had studied and advocated state worker accident compen-
sation programs, health insurance, and unemployment insurance pro-
grams. Here were specifics I could comprehend which would improve
the quality and standard of living. I believed that the creation of these
institutions would improve the health and welfare standard of living and
the quality of life.
I was fortunate shortly thereafter to be assigned a minor role in the
effort to create the various institutional proposals which eventually be-
came the Social Security Act of 1935 and then later in the additions to
it, such as survivors insurance, disability insurance and Medicare, and
in 1950-51 to help accelerate the role of the private sector in health,
welfare, and pensions as chairman of the Wage Stabilization Board
committee in this area.
It is now about forty-five years since I started this work. It has been
exciting, controversial, and challenging. Although there are some—even488 Alan S. Blinder/ Irving Kristol/Wilbur J. Cohen
many—who increasingly doubt the wisdom of specific programs or pro-
visions, I doubt if there are many, or any, who would question the
generalization that the overall health and welfare standard of living has
improved since 1930, 1940, 1950, or 1960, and even since 1970. The
questions of how much of an improvement and for whom may defy
precise measurement. But there certainly is evidence of improvement
in that infant mortality has declined; life expectancy has increased; abso-
lute poverty has declined; individuals have more choice about work,
leisure, and retirement; and more persons have access to education,
medical care, housing, transportation, and recreation.
The questions today are not as simplistic as they were in the thirties.
There are questions as to how and why these improvements occurred
and what would have happened if all of the programs had developed in
the private sector.
There are different ways of looking at the changing standard of living.
Economists look at income, measure it, and compare it over time. We
draw certain conclusions from such measurements. But I think there are
other elements to be considered: the range of choices, continuity of in-
come, future expectations, educational attainment, opportunities for self-
fulfillment, the balance between work and leisure, not to mention clean
air and water, and freedom from chemical and nuclear wastes.
In addition, the predominant lesson to be derived from recent experi-
ences is that we live—and will continue to live—in a very imperfect
world. We have experienced major miscalculations on the part of presi-
dents and other politicians, business, labor, social reformers, and even
economists. We are all living in glass houses. We find we cannot control
the forces around us as simply, quickly, or effectively as we would like.
Alan S. Blinder's essay "The Level and Distribution of Economic
Well-Being" reviews not only a wide range of economic data relating to
the issue of equality and inequality of income in the postwar period,
but in addition he deals with such topics as black-white income differen-
tials, the poor and poverty, leisure time, health, "the privilege of living
apart from relatives," illegitimate birth, divorce, suicide, and crime rates
as social indicators, and even happiness!
This is indeed a wide range of controversial topics. However, I miss
a reference to such other related questions as smoking, abortion, drug
use, and some other questions such as women's use of time in the home
and office, the Equal Rights Amendment, changes in life-styles and other
questions which relate to health, education, welfare, and happiness.
A significant aspect of his paper seems to me the brief inclusion of
some social indicators in an economic review. I had almost given up on
the possibility that economists would attempt to interrelate economic
and social indicators.489 The Level and Distribution of Economic Weil-Being
One of the key issues in Mr. Blinder's essay is the impact of the in-
come transfer programs on equality and inequality of income. Table
C6.1 displays the increases which took place in the twenty-five-year
period from 1950 to 1975.
In 1950 all public and private expenditures for health, education, and
welfare were equivalent to 13.4 percent of gross national product. By
1970, this indicator had risen to 21.8 percent, by 1975 to 27 percent,
by 1976 to 27.5 percent, but then decreased to 27.1 percent in 1977
and 26.8 percent in 1978.
All income maintenance program expenditures were only 4 percent
of GNP in 1950, reached 6 percent in 1960, 7.5 percent in 1970, 10.6
percent in 1975 and peaked at 10.9 percent in 1976 with a decrease to
10.6 percent in 1977 and 10.2 percent in 1978.
Are we at the end of an era of significant expansion of the income
maintenance programs? Or will the continued increase in the number
and proportion of the aged result in further increases?
Health program expenditures were 4.5 percent of GNP in 1950, then
5.2 percent in 1960, 7.2 percent by 1970, 8.4 percent by 1975 and
continued to increase to 8.6 percent in 1976, 9 percent in 1977 and 9.2
percent in 1978. It is likely that this figure will reach 10 percent of GNP
during the 1980s.
However, I do not think the overall total of such expenditures as a
percentage of GNP will be lower in 1990 than the figure for 1980. The
private pension plan area is still expanding. Social security benefits are
indexed to increasing wages and prices. The increasing number of aged
will increase expenditures for medical services under Medicare and sup-
plementary private arrangements. Proposals for catastrophic health in-
Table C6.1 Public and Private Expenditures for
Social Welfare Purposes, 1950 and 1975,
as Percentage of Gross National Product,

























Source: Alfred M. Skolnik and Sophie R. Dales, "Social
Welfare Expenditures, 1950-75," Social Security Bulletin 39,
no. 1 (January 1976): 19, with 1978 revisions from table 2
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surance coverage and for coverage of services for all mothers and chil-
dren are under Congressional discussion as is welfare reform.
Several years ago I estimated that the total of these expenditures
might reach 33 percent of GNP between 1980 and 1990. I am not so
sure of this now but I have not withdrawn this speculative projection
because I believe the built-in elements related to economic and demo-
graphic factors eventually will overweigh the political constraints on
growth.
Several possible lines of change, however, must be recognized.
1. Program changes are likely to be considered for reallocating re-
sources in relation to priorities. In health this could take the form of
cost constraints in the expansion of health maintenance organizations,
for example, and other changes in the health delivery system. In educa-
tion, it could involve closure of some doctoral programs, closing of some
elementary schools, and pressures to constrain salary improvements.
In social security it could involve changes in the retirement age or
freezing the minimum benefit for persons with short periods of coverage
in the social security system.
I am not sure that all of these changes are necessary, desirable, or
feasible, but I do think there will be more questioning of prior decisions
and more controversy about priorities, and such issues at the program
margins will produce strong emotional responses.
2. There probably will be greater emphasis on redistribution of in-
come measures. The rise in the payroll taxes since 1950 has now re-
sulted in pressures to limit the increase in such taxes and even proposals
for a rollback. The recent recommendation of the Advisory Council on
Social Security for an earmarked income tax for financing Medicare
illustrates this development.
3. Expenditures will continue to expand in the private sector. Pro-
posals for catastrophic health insurance will surely involve mandating
employer coverage under private health insurance.
As the size and importance of income maintenance and health pro-
grams have grown, there has been an increased recognition of the inter-
relationships between tax, expenditure, economic, and fiscal policy on
the one hand and income maintenance policy on the other. But I am
not at all sure where we will come out on this matter over the next sev-
eral years. There is more to the resolution of this issue than economic
policy alone: Psychology and politics play important roles. There are,
therefore, many different options available to the American people and
to the Congress.
While redistribution of income in terms of income classes is of vital
concern to economists and some of the American people, redistribution493 The Level and Distribution of Economic Weil-Being
of income over one's own lifetime is probably of greater interest to most
working people. The average head of family is concerned about the dis-
tribution of his or her income over time for such purposes as purchasing
a home; providing for accidents, disability, premature death, or for
retirement and medical costs; and, in many cases, meeting the cost of
educating his or her children.
Because of the nature of the relationship between the private and
public sectors in this country, the resolution of the crucial issues in in-
come maintenance and health has been related more to the philosophy
underlying this relationship than to income redistribution. It is therefore
essential, in my opinion, for us to comprehend the larger context within
which our social welfare programs and expenditures operate rather than
judging them solely in relation to the way they affect the Lorenz curve
or the Gini ratio.
I believe the size and nature of both national and family obligations
and expenditures will determine the choice of options for future policy
in health, social security, and welfare reform.
I think that, by and large, in the American situation, there is no sub-
stantial political pressure for equality of income, though there is a con-
sensus on equality of opportunity—and that is a very important distinc-
tion. There is wide recognition that certain factors in our society impair
equality of opportunity—that is, access to jobs, education, health ser-
vices, or housing. Over the years, those persons who have been advo-
cating improvement in the income maintenance, education, and health
programs have not attempted to obtain absolute equality or even to
approach equality of income, but rather to provide a greater degree of
equality of opportunity, which is what the middle class and the blue-
collar workers (as well as others) stress as an important objective.
Summary of Discussion
Peter Peterson expressed unease over the uncertainties surrounding fu-
ture costs of various United States income transfer programs. Noting
that we "operate in a sea of ignorance" about the full, discounted costs
of public policies, he suggested that we undertake a policy of "truth-in-
spending" as we have "truth-in-lending." Wilbur Cohen shared the con-
cern, adding that until recently the expectation was that continued eco-
nomic growth would finance the programs.494 Alan S. Blinder/Irving Kristol/Wilbur J. Cohen
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